slvemike4u
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quote:
ORIGINAL: jlf1961
Nimitz was NOT CincPac until 31 Dec 1941.
On December 22 at 21:00, after receiving information indicating the presence of two IJN carriers and two fast battleships near Wake Island Vice Admiral William S. Pye, the Acting Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, ordered TF-14 to return to Pearl Harbor for fear of losses. {At the Battle of Midway Pye ordered battleships to patrol from the West Coast-in case of a Japanese attack; after Wake and Midway he never commanded forces in battle again}.
These ships were well within range to land the 4th Marine Coastal Defense Battalion, as well as supplies of ammunition and a squadren of F2A Brewster Buffalos during the night of 22 December/23 December, which would have given the Japanese a nasty surprise.
With the American carriers standing off shore between Wake and Midway, they would have been in position to cover and support Wake and force the Japanese to re-evaluate their opperations.
The force the Japanese had disignated to land on the island was equivalent to 3 reinforced Japanese Marine Companies, considerably smaller than a CDB.
Add to that the one thing that Yamamoto was not willing to do was to get into a battle that could cost him aircraft carrier assets. He had no clue prior to Pearl Harbor where the 3 US carriers were, and should there be ANY indication of US carriers operating in the Wake atoll area, the operations pre-planned for the Pacific and South Pacific would become threatened had he suffered a loss or even damage.
Nimitz had made it clear that Wake should be supported, prior to receiving command of the pacific fleet, which earned him a lot of respect in Washington. The citizens of the United States fully expected Wake to be supported, especially after they beat off the first invasion attempt.
The loss of Wake Island hampered operations in the central pacific area of operations for 2 years. Wake would have provided a forward base for B24's, US submarines, recon patrols.
The fact that Admiral Pye ordered those ships about, AND proved his inability to react to enemy movements during the Midway crisis, was what effectively took him out of combat command.
The Philippines was untenable due to distance, and the disaster at Pearl, but Wake was not.
You are correct as to when Nimitz assumed command,the fact was the decision had already been made for him to assume command ,and it was with this in mind the TF was recalled.
Any assertion of the utility or usefullness of the Brewster Buffalos that you beleive would have given the Japaneese a "nasty surprise"totally ignores the actual capabilities of these lumbering outdated aircraft,The Englsh would not accept them during The Battle of Britain when their need for anything that flew was at is peak.One need only look at their performance at the Battle of Midway to guage how they would have done at Wake... at Midway they were simply disposed of by the far superior Zero...a lousy airplane off the assembly line ,an outdated and total death trap at the time of war
Was the TF in range,could the fighters have taken off and made Wake, the answer is yes to both questions...could we have held Wake given the material and manpower shortage ...The critical needs in other areas ,the woeful state of our readiness in a word ...no
Please don't take my opinion ,the general accepted historical opinion is that while the failure to reinforce led to tragic consequences for the Marine garrison it was the correct decision at the time....if i could provide links i would,but i can't my apologies
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