DedicatedDom40 -> RE: Derivatives for Dummies (10/9/2009 6:13:46 PM)
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quote:
The problem was bankers were dealing with financial instruments they didnt understand. They kept making more unsecured loans, which in turn swelled the books, they used the profits to make more loans. Bear, AIG and Lehman did not fail because of bad loans on their books. These big institutions failed from an inability to cover their derivatives liabilities (the bad bets they had on their books - bad bets are different than bad loans.) They got into the betting bookie business and were unable to pay all the 'winners' who had a right to get paid, and those winners do include foreigners, and those foreigners are not necessarily foreign banks (hedge funds are not banks). Yes, some of the bailout money is being used to help the bookie (AIG) pay its debts to people, including foreign-based hedge funds, who placed bets at AIG's betting parlor. The inability to cover derivatives liabilities is also what took Enron down as well, except Enron's liabilities were related to energy derivatives (betting on energy prices) rather than the mortgage derivatives that imploded the big banks. Enron execs also tried to hide their losses from investors (that was the primary reason Ken Lay went to jail) while the banks did not. All the corporate implosions due to deriviatives, Enron first and now the investmemt banks, were enabled by the same piece of legislation passed in 2000. The worst thing Enron did was brown out California for a few months, while the banks had alot more global systemic risk. Now, the smaller banks on small town street corners, yes, they are failing from the bad loans and the falling value of real estate in their loan portfolios. The problem is a two-stage one. The people who created the bad loans that ultimately popped the housing bubble had little to do with the investment bank bookie taking on too many bets that they couldnt possibly pay off. Indirectly connected by the same trigger, but two seperate events in two different circles are involved here. The value of remaining derivatives outstanding (bets that were already placed and that could be called upon for payment if the relevant trigger is activated) is estimated at 50 trillion, or in other words, alot more than the value of the real estate "bad loans" problem.
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