DesideriScuri -> Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (1/17/2013 5:05:37 PM)
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Finally getting to this, tazzy... Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (wiki, Google Books entry) Written by Senator Phil Gramm (R - Texas), Representatives Jim Leach (R - Iowa) and Thomas J. Bliley Jr. (R - Virginia):quote:
It repealed part of the Glass–Steagall Act of 1933, removing barriers in the market among banking companies, securities companies and insurance companies that prohibited any one institution from acting as any combination of an investment bank, a commercial bank, and an insurance company. With the passage of the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act, commercial banks, investment banks, securities firms, and insurance companies were allowed to consolidate. The legislation was signed into law by President Bill Clinton. For no other reason than for a successful copy/paste of the following, I used this link. The part of this I wanted is quoted below. It is an excerpt from a 1987 Congressional Research Service study outlining the positives and negatives for preserving The Glass-Steagall Act.quote:
The Case for Preserving the Glass-Steagall Act: 1. Conflicts of interest characterize the granting of credit - lending - and the use of credit - investing - by the same entity, which led to abuses that originally produced the Act. 2. Depository institutions possess enormous financial power, by virtue of their control of other people's money. Its extent must be limited to ensure soundness and competition in the market for funds, whether loans or investments. 3. Securities activities can be risky, leading to enormous losses. Such losses could threaten the integrity of deposits. In turn, the Government insures deposits and could be required to pay large sums if depository institutions were to collapse as the result of securities losses. 4. Depository institutions are supposed to be managed to limit risk. Their managers, thus, may not be conditioned to operate prudently in more speculative securities businesses. The case against preserving the Glass-Steagall Act: 1. Depository institutions will now operate in "deregulated" financial markets in which distinctions between loans, securities, and deposits are not well drawn. They are losing market shares to securities firms that are not so strictly regulated and to foreign financial institutions operating without much restriction from the Act. 2. Conflicts of interest can be prevented by enforcing legislation against them and by separating the lending and credit functions through forming distinctly separate subsidiaries of financial firms. 3. The securities activities that depository institutions are seeking are both low-risk, by their very nature, and would reduce the total risk of organizations offering them, by diversification. 4. In much of the rest of the world, depository institutions operate simultaneously and successfully in both banking and securities markets. Lessons learned from their experiences can be applied to our national financial structure and regulation. Representative John Dingell (D - Michigan) was not exactly thrilled with the legislation, and even stated that it creates "institutions that are ‘‘too big to fail.’’" He continued:quote:
It also authorizes banks’ direct operating subsidiaries to engage in risky new principal activities like securities underwriting and, in five years, merchant banking with Treasury and Federal Reserve approval. The flimsy limitations and firewalls will not hold back contagion and underscore the foolishness in not reforming deposit insurance, and thus the threat to taxpayers and depositors. What was the point of Glass-Steagall (bold mine)?quote:
The Glass–Steagall Act is a term often applied to the entire Banking Act of 1933, after its Congressional sponsors, Senator Carter Glass (D) of Virginia, and Representative Henry B. Steagall (D) of Alabama.[1] The term Glass–Steagall Act, however, is most often used to refer to four provisions of the Banking Act of 1933 that limited commercial bank securities activities and affiliations between commercial banks and securities firms.[2] What did the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act do?quote:
repealed part of the Glass–Steagall Act of 1933, removing barriers in the market among banking companies, securities companies and insurance companies that prohibited any one institution from acting as any combination of an investment bank, a commercial bank, and an insurance company. One of the central tenets of Glass-Steagall was repealed by Gramm-Leach-Bliley. Even taking Rep. Dingell's apparent prescience into account, I'm still not convinced Gramm-Leach-Bliley is to blame for the Great Recession. Nope, I'm not. Why, you might ask? Well, take this into account:quote:
First of all, Gramm-Leach-Bliley is hardly the momentus event the left makes it out to be. The 1933 Glass-Steagal Act that prohibited commercial banks from owning investment banks, and vice versa, had been steadily weakened since the 70s by an increasingly diverse and complex new financial reality. Waivers from regulators for merger became routine and the 1998 merger between Travelers and Citigroup functionally repealed the law. Gramm-Leach-Bliley only put a de jure stamp of approval on a de facto regulatory framework. Second, the left has simply offered no explanation as to how the merging of commercial and investment banks caused the current crisis. In fact, the evidence so far shows that Gramm-Leach-Bliley has helped soften the blow to taxpayers by allowing commercial banks to take over trouble investment firms. Just look at which organization’s have failed: - Bear Stearns was an investment bank before it was sold to JP Morgan Chase (which includes a commercial bank).
- Fannie Mae were[sic] Freddie Mac were government sponsored entities before the government bought them.
- Lehman Brothers was an investment bank before it want bankrupt.
- Merrill Lynch was an investment bank befor it was sold to Bank of America (which is a commercial bank).
- AIG is an insurance company with no commercial banking division.
Remember, Glass-Steagal was passed to protect commercial banks from failure by forbidding them from investment bank practices like trading in securities and underwriting stocks and bonds. As you can see above non of the failed institutions are commercial banks that got in trouble through risky investment banking. Instead, it is the commercial banks that are providing some stability to the system by purchasing troubled investment banks. Without Gramm-Leach-Bliley they would not even be allowed to technically do this. And, lest we resort to partisan politics and rail at the right for writing and passing the Legislation and "forcing" Clinton to sign it... [image]http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/2/25/Gramm-Leach-Bliley_Vote_1999.png/640px-Gramm-Leach-Bliley_Vote_1999.png[/image] Not only did Gramm-Leach-Bliley not actually cause the Great Recession, it was also a bipartisan bill that had 90% support in the Senate and 83% support in the House. When you consider that 10 no or "no vote" votes in the Senate, 3 were Republicans, and there were 15 House Republicans that voted either "no" or "no vote." With a 55-45 R-D split in the Senate and a 222-211-1 R-D-I split in the House, there was no way this Act wasn't going forward without bipartisanship.
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