Zonie63
Posts: 2826
Joined: 4/25/2011 From: The Old Pueblo Status: offline
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ORIGINAL: NorthernGent The Germans were soundly beaten in WW1, militarily and economically. There was absolutely no way back for them. General Haig calculated that the war would have continued into June 1919 had the Allies attempted to invade Germany, but, still, the Germans were as beaten as they were on D-Day WW2: it was merely a matter of time. True, although I recall that a month and a half after D-Day, there was a bomb plot against Hitler. If Hitler had been killed/overthrown and the Germans immediately sued for peace, that would have saved countless lives and (in my opinion) would have been worthy of more generous terms. At least in terms of determining "war guilt," punishing entire nations (or races, for that matter) over the actions of a few seems terribly unjust. I can't imagine there not being outrage over such a thing. Just as was happening in Russia, Germany was facing internal problems and revolution. quote:
Wilsons' 14 points, at least those proposed by the Americans, were hijacked by the British and French who ensured there were amendments that benefitted both countries, obviously. Part of the reason was because one of the senior American officials involved, I think his name was House, and the US Government hadn't prepared for Versailles particularly well and they were ambushed by the British and French. The only party who really lost out on of a couple of their main aims was the French who wanted to invade Germany and make the Rhineland an independent zone which would act as buffer zone. It was unfortunate for Wilson and the United States that Wilson became ill. He was also somewhat disillusioned by the feeding frenzy at Versailles, and his political position had gotten weaker to the point that nothing he signed at Versailles made it past the US Senate. Ultimately, it was a mistake for Britain and France to alienate Wilson that way, since it only further fed US isolationist sentiment and also created more sympathy for Germany. Americans who visited Germany after the war saw a clean, orderly, friendly society, in contrast to war-torn France which seemed dirty and nasty by comparison. A lot of Americans couldn't see any kind of threat from Germany and couldn't understand why we were at war with them at all. quote:
In terms of Russia, they had actually modernised quite well since the last aborted revolution some time around 1904, e.g. railway building which was very important in terms of conducting a war around that time. The Germans had calculated that by 1917 the Russian railway system but be on a par with that of Germany, which had obvious implications for mobilisation and moving troops around, so for the Germans it was now or never. I would point out that, oftentimes, calculations made by experts can often go awry. Sometimes they're right, sometimes not. Russia was still decades behind the West in terms of industry and infrastructure, although it's true that the regime of Nicholas II had made more progress in that area than any of his predecessors. I believe the French were also helpful with the railway system, since they wanted the Russians to be able to move troops quickly towards their frontier with Germany. But the debacle with Japan in 1904-05 was what brought about the 1905 Revolution, although I wouldn't say it was an aborted revolution. The Tsar was forced to pull out of the war with Japan (which was a disaster anyway), as well as agree to the reinstatement of the Duma and various land reforms which had been called for since the emancipation of the Serfs. But there were still problems with work stoppages, strikes, and the assassination of Stolypin caused the Tsar to reverse the earlier reforms and shut down the Duma. quote:
It is true, though, that certainly in England the Russians were viewed as barbarians and many people in this country could not understand why we were fighting a war on the side of Russia against Germany (seen as a highly civilised nation). In terms of foreign policy, Russia's aims were pretty simple actually. They wanted further expansionism in East Asia, which had been thwarted by the Japanese (and the British ostensibly felt Russia was the bigger threat to their Asian holdings than Japan was at that moment). They also wanted an ice-free seaport, which was also a concern to the British. And, as an Orthodox nation, they wanted to retake Constantinople for Orthodoxy, which also put them at odds with the Ottoman Empire and made them natural allies of their Orthodox brethren in the Balkans. (This is the primary reason why I give very little credence or sympathy to Westerners who go on and on about the so-called "Muslim threat," since the Russians had been facing that threat for centuries while the West acted more as a hindrance and barrier than anything else. The West's reaction during the Crimean War was a perfect example of this.) As the Ottoman Empire was slowly withdrawing from the mostly-Orthodox Balkans, the Russians felt that it was their responsibility to help their fellow Orthodox, although the Catholic Austro-Hungarian Empire was moving in and trying to grab for whatever they could. Meanwhile, Serbian nationalists who had been resisting Turkish rule for centuries had finally gained independence and felt that Austria was taking advantage of their fragile and vulnerable situation. The Austrians should have stayed out of the Balkans altogether; that was Orthodox domain. In terms of actual "war guilt," that's where the lion's share of it should be. Meanwhile, the French and the Russians were allies of convenience due to a shared fear of growing German militarism, and the Germans felt boxed in on two fronts. quote:
In terms of Lenin and Trotsky, they simply wanted the war stopped at all costs, even if meant giving up large swathes of their land. Yes, this is true. Lenin made a promise of "peace, land, and bread," and the war was largely viewed as an imperialist war anyway. Asking Russian peasants to sacrifice their lives to prop up Western imperialism and capitalism was not something Lenin or Trotsky were particularly inclined to do. quote:
Ultimately, though, being defeated in a war does not necessarily lead to wanting to start another war to redress the balance - experience tells us this. Well, sometimes, there are nations which are so utterly defeated that they're physically unable to start another war anytime soon. But there can still be resistance and resentment which can last for centuries. Recalling my earlier example about Constantinople, the Russians had fought numerous wars with Turkey over a period of centuries. A lot of wars have been fought for revenge over something in the past. There's no statute of limitations when it comes to things like that. Even our current conflicts today can be traced back to events from decades or even centuries in the past. I wouldn't underestimate the human propensity and desire for revenge. That's another major flaw in the West's perception of the rest of the world, since we think that everyone has as short an attention-span as we do. But I also think that we've learned some things over the centuries, which might be why Germany and Japan today are modern, developed, as well as considered close allies and economic partners with us, since our post-war attitude was more benevolent than it was at Versailles and at other times in history. This was true, even though we inflicted far more damage upon Germany and Japan than we ever have on any nation before or since WW2. It just goes to show that it's not the amount of physical damage or even the loss of life which makes other nations hate us. It's the adding of insult to injury, the lies, and the hypocrisy that makes other nations hate us. (Kind of the same reasons why many Americans also hate their own government.) quote:
The real sticking point between England and Germany, was that we weren't prepared to risk any continental European power blocking our free access to the channel, could have been Germany, France, Russia or anyone; and this dictated our policy towards continental Europe for centuries. We very rarely sent an army into Europe at the outbreak of war, WW1 being the exception, and it when we did send an army, e.g. Napoleon, it happened when the risk was deemed to be too much to ignore. It is widely understood in England that in the event we had a guarantee that the Germans were interested only in continental Europe, then we would have snapped their hands off and asked no questions. Similarly, we could have lived with a lot worse such as at the outbreak of war stated German aims were a European (continent) Customs Union ran by the Germans - and we could certainly have lived with that because this didn't interfere with our interests and prosperity - in fact, it may have been preferable to the British Government. What we couldn't risk was Germany defeating France and taking a stranglehold on Northern French ports, because that really was a problem for our trade interests. A request had been given to the Germans to respect Belgian neutrality, not because we particularly cared about the Belgians: why would we? But, when the answer that came back was no, then that told the British Government that these people weren't be to be trusted when it came to negotiations. So, when they said they wanted to strike a bargain involving German hegemony in continental Europe and British dominance of the seas, we weren't convinced that their intentions were vested in compromise. I see your point with the German and Russian view of the world, but my view would be that much of it is a result of geography and the inevitable difference in ideas. The Germans may have seen it differently. Based on your analysis above, it still seems to indicate that the British were wary of German intentions, that there was some worry that the Germans would ultimately threaten Britain's sovereignty or try to take part of all of their Empire. The British wariness and view of Germany as a potential threat was quite well-founded, considering the rise of German nationalism and various malignant racist/nationalist philosophies gaining a strong following in Germany, as well as in America, France, Italy, Japan, and even in Britain to some extent. Other than that, I can see your point about British access to the Channel and that positive control on both sides of that waterway would be vital to your interests. That's also a function of geography, just as geography affected the German and Russian point of view. Geography also played a significant role in shaping America's view of the world, too. Still, a port is a port, so whether it's under French management or German management, it may not have made that much difference in terms of British trade interests, depending on the intentions and geopolitical aspirations of the individual players and political factions involved. But the Germans also might have wondered why Britain was so worried in the first place, since their geopolitical and territorial aims were never really against Britain or its Empire. They had a grudge with France, and the Germans and Russians had been fighting each other for over a millennia, none of which had anything to do with Britain. Some Germans could have potentially seen England as a natural ally of Germany, whether against France or possibly Russia - or even as partners against growing American geopolitical/economic dominance of the world. Even if they wanted to pose a threat to England, they knew they couldn't do so anyway; it was logistically not feasible, as both World Wars pretty much proved. German military leaders knew this as well, so their main war aims seemed focused on the Continent while keeping enough naval strength to be able to keep England off their backs. quote:
I agree that it wasn't necessarily anti-liberal, since Nietzsche was certainly a liberal as witnessed by renouncing his German citizenship etc. But, it certainly was a peculiarly German way of looking at things, i.e. the idea that Europe was well and truly on the verge of destruction and only a return to pre-industrial days could save the continent. Considering what happened in the World Wars, it doesn't seem like such a view would be entirely off-base, since Europe did face a great deal of destruction. Those European nations with colonies lost nearly all of them in the years that followed, and many European nations became little more than pawns of either the US or USSR in a larger Cold War taking place. I suppose the irony in all of this is that the German fear of destruction became a self-fulfilling prophecy. Some Allied leaders advocated that Germany be made into nothing more than a giant goat pasture. Or at the very least, they wanted Germany to be totally impotent, so that they could never, ever, ever again be able to launch such aggression and hostility towards other nations. I think this was a major sticking point between the US and USSR, and the US government's decision to build up West German industry and make them into a proxy state against the USSR might have been the catalyst which propelled us into the Cold War. quote:
Where I may disagree is that Liberalism and Nationalism existing side by side, whilst it certainly has done and did then, did not apply to Germany of the time. The German government machine, at least those with real power, was a reactionary, conservative, militaristic affair. It is true that Germany had the largest socialist movement in Europe in 1914; it is also true that the Germans had an advanced welfare system which the British had copied to an extent. But, the Reichstag and assorted socialist parties held little power in Germany. Power sat in the hands of the military first and foremost, and the Kaiser second. These were the people who dictated Germany's foreign policy in June 1914 and they were convinced that Germany must dominate continental Europe and now was the time to do it. I think the Germans were clearly on the road toward liberal democracy, certainly more so than the reactionary Tsarist regime in Russia. I think Bismarck wanted to work with the British, whereas the Kaiser had other ideas, and the Kaiser ended up firing Bismarck, if I recall correctly. I think that may have sent a signal to the British that the Kaiser was a bit of a loon and couldn't really be trusted. Even as a child, I recall a story that he was attending a funeral for some royal figure and bit an English prince on the ankle. I don't remember the name of the prince, although he was a hemophiliac, which posed a bit of a problem at the time. I've often considered that Britain and France may have been more liberal than Germany and other nations possibly due to the fact that they had large empires and acquired a great deal of national wealth which allowed them to be more generous with their own people. Germany was up-and-coming, but they didn't have the same access to resources which Britain and France enjoyed at the time (America, too). They knew that they could be very easily blockaded and bottled up - a fear which was no less real than the British fears of German expansion and malignant nationalism at the time. With Britain and France on one side and Russia on the other side, their actions might suggest that they felt cornered and had no other choice but to fight their way out. quote:
In terms of domestic industry we'd been surpassed by the Germans (not just the Germans, also by the Americans by the way). We'd grown fat on success and had forgotten the basics, also they had more people. In terms of music and philosophy the Germans were predisposed to do very well in these areas due to their instinct to look inwards. I did read somewhere that the 20th century should have been the German century, not the American century, due to German endeavours in the areas you mention during the 19th century. The only areas where we could have argued we remained the world's leader were international commerce and literature (and even literature would be debatable given the efforts of the Germans during the 19th century). It could have been considered the British century, too, at least at the start. If you look at a map of the world from 1910, the British had an enormous Empire, with the French being a distant second. We Americans were also pretty busy on our continent, as well as in Latin America and establishing ourselves along the Pacific Rim. In the later part of the 19th and early 20th centuries, American literature and music were also coming into their own. It was good timing, too, since moving pictures, radio, and phonograph recordings were coming into existence. quote:
This is true, but it may be worth considering that the naval race was over by 1911. The Germans had accepted defeat in this. Furthermore, the Germans didn't have an exhaustless budget, and so they needed this money for the army. They envisaged a war around 1914, so they had a choice to make. Either continue to compete with Britain in the naval sphere or bolster the army. The Kaiser had gone about building ships not realising that this was a cue for the British to build more and even more powerful, and so when the Kaiser and associates realised we weren't about to give up our dominance of the seas without a huge fight; they called it off and went back to concentrating on the army. So, our antagonism with the Germans was over well before June 1914, which is why we gave no guarantee to the French around that time, and made it clear to them that there was no guarantee. It seems the Germans were forced to shift their naval strategy to using submarines more. They couldn't win the naval race, but they did prove to be a menace under the sea. That was one of the key reasons the US eventually declared war on Germany, ostensibly triggered by the Kaiser's declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare which could threaten American shipping. German submarines were an even more destructive menace during WW2. It tied up a lot of US ships which were also badly needed in the Pacific. quote:
In the end we agreed, but had they answered yes to our request to respect Belgian neutrality then it is likely we would not have gotten involved in the war, at least at the outbreak. Yes, Belgium was in an unfortunate position, geographically speaking. There was the earlier Schlieffen Plan which involved German forces moving through the Low Countries in order to invade France. Perhaps they thought that was the best way to achieve a quick victory, and it actually worked for them in 1940. I thought that the British and the French had pretty much reached agreement in 1907 that they would be allies in the event of war with Germany. This was after the Morocco affair in 1905 when the British interceded on the side of the French against the German attempt to annex that colony. The other complication was that France was an ally of Russia, which was an ally of Serbia which was under attack by Austria, an ally of Germany. Even if the Germans had left Belgium alone, it doesn't seem likely that Britain would have been able to stay out of it for very long (just as America could not stay out of it either). The Germans may have considered this and gambled on a quick victory over France and force a stalemate with the British which would free the Germans to concentrate on the Eastern Front. quote:
The liberal government of the day was generally against the war, but the German decision to go through Belgium gave the moralists a justification for convincing the waverers and those against the war that we couldn't stay out. Of the important figures in the cabinet, I think only Churchill and Asquith thought it was a good idea - until the Belgium thing. I think there were similar divisions of opinion in America, too. There were those (such as Teddy Roosevelt) who wanted to go to war with Germany right away, but those who favored peace and "no foreign entanglements" still prevailed in the court of public opinion. We didn't really see it as our fight. Even with the Belgium thing, when we look at the overall history of Europe, it seemed to be a relatively common practice of armies marching through countries, annexing territories belonging to other nationalities. It seemed to be something that everyone was guilty of at one time or another. That, in and of itself, would not be seen as a proper casus belli for the US to enter the war. But after the Zimmerman Note came to light, along with the Kaiser's declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare, that gave the war hawks enough support for the US to go to war, which the British and French welcomed with open arms. quote:
I think you answered this in your sentence immediately preceding this one. They had invested so much in the war that they wanted a return. In fact, the demands of Britain, Germany and France became more adventurous as the war trundled on. But that was the real tragedy, since they all ended up losing something essential in the end. quote:
Well, I'd imagine there's much more to American culture than the superficial exports that we see. But, I think any American on his/her first visit to Europe would be surprised at the extent to which US cultural exports have taken root in Europe. I've seen quite a lot of commercial exports and American brand names, and I suppose one could consider that "cultural" from a certain perspective. I've talked to a number of Europeans who seem to focus on McDonalds as some kind symbol of American culture (which I've always found a bit strange). American music, movies, and TV shows seem to have gained an international following, although I've been told that European film companies and movie theaters were in such a shambles after WW2 that it became easy pickings for US companies to buy them up. American music - jazz, blues, rock, and all of their various derivations have definitely made their mark across the globe, influencing many great British musicians who were part of the British Invasion mentioned upthread. When I talk to Europeans and others around the world, what strikes me is that they really only know America on a superficial, "pop culture" basis - and sometimes disparate, inexplicable aspects which seem to confound them more than anything else. quote:
Yes, by the standards of the North the South would have been viewed as semi-industrial, but by world standards the South would have been viewed as a modern nation (freedom of press, advanced communications etc). From what I've read, the idea of a highly industrialised North and a slave-based economy backward South doesn't tell the full story. In many ways the South was a modern nation, just not as widely industrially advanced as the North. The Southern press wasn't really that free. Early on just after America gained independence, there appeared to be a growing dispute over what direction America's economy should take. Hamilton and many Northerners argued for greater industry and manufacturing, so that we didn't have to rely on European imports. Jefferson and others wanted the US to be a bountiful source of raw materials while still believing that we could rely on manufactured imports from Europe. The Northern economy also grew to be much more diverse, whereas the Southern economy was solely dependent on a single commodity. Of course, the two economies were hardly isolated from each other, so naturally, some aspects of the Southern economy might have seemed "modern" by world standards, but only due to their connection with the Northern economy. Once that connection was broken during the Civil War, the South suffered immensely. Once they lost control of the Mississippi River and the Confederacy was cut in two, it was only a matter of time. Lee's resourcefulness and military successes in the East kept the Confederacy breathing a while longer, but even he knew it was a no-win situation. quote:
Yes, I did visit the museum at Franklin, think it was known as the Carter House (can't quite remember). Anyway, I think the owners of the estate were Unionists and plenty in the area were (as per the guide). Also, from what I can gather, certain parts of Virginia were heavily Unionist. I did read, though, that there wasn't necessarily a correlation between the amount of people holding slaves in a state or area of a state and the amount of people willing to fight. Although probably for another thread. And, yes, I don't think there's any doubt that the United States being the world's superpower has been to our advantage. There have been drawbacks, but by and large we still punch above our weight and that's because the government of the country with the most power in the world sees the world pretty much not that different to our government. I don't think anyone was either for or against a certain side just because of where they lived. No doubt many in the North didn't actually want to fight a war to keep the Southern States in the Union. Not everyone was as enthusiastic about that fight as others were. It's always been a curiosity that the Southern States were able to find so many recruits willing to fight for the Confederacy, even among poor whites who didn't own slaves and who had no stake in defending slavery. With the exception of the economic elite who controlled the slaves and most of the land, the rest of the population was in pretty much dire straits, so why that would engender so much loyalty on the part of the common people has always been a bit of a mystery. After the war, there was likely no stopping the United States. European countries sent military observers to America during the Civil War, and if nothing else, it was clear that America was more than capable of fielding and equipping large modern armies which could rival Europe. While America was not yet in a position to send troops to Europe or mount any real threat, it was clear that no European nation could ever challenge America on its own soil. That's why the French bailed out of Mexico so quickly after the Civil War. I think British leadership probably saw the big picture and realized that recognizing the Confederacy would have been a bad move all the way around. Even if it might have been temporarily beneficial to certain British economic interests, there was still the larger picture to consider. Both American and British political and economic leaders at the time had a certain strategic wisdom which benefited both powers, although at some point, succeeding generations seem to have dropped the ball to some degree which led to more difficult situations. They were only "liberal" on a relative scale, but it wasn't until after WW2 that the progressives started to gain ground, making the pre-WW1 "liberalism" look duplicitous and not very "liberal" at all.
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