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tweakabelle -> RE: So . . . what do we do about Daesh? (11/20/2015 8:46:29 PM)
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quote:
ORIGINAL: Marc2b
Our enemy is Daesh. Daesh is anti-civilization. Daesh is violently aggressive and lacks any morality.
Daesh must be destroyed as a functioning organization.
This is what I would like to see (not what I expect to see but I can always hope). I think that the political leaders of the NATO states, all twenty-eight of them, should gather in a summit and draw up plans for a “post war” settlement that will come after the military defeat of Daesh. It will probably be necessary to place Syria and Iraq under temporary occupation during which time relief efforts will need to be coordinated. Some ruffled feathers will need to be smoothed over such as Turkey’s relationship with the Kurds. I don’t pretend to have all the answers but the political questions must be settled first.
Once the political questions are resolved (hopefully it won’t take to long) then the political leadership can say to NATO’s military leadership: “here is the objective, here are the human and material resources at your command, make the necessary preparations and then go.” Overwhelming force should be used.
If this were to happen, Daesh could be a memory in six months. Maybe less.
Can I commend you for recognising the need to develop a political strategy before seeking to deal with Daesh militarily? While it is so obvious that any anti-Deash strategy must be primarily political to have any chance of success, it is astonishing how many commentators fail to realise this.
While I agree that if we develop appropriate strategies to deal with Daesh it could be eliminated as an effective force within a short time frame, unfortunately I cannot share your optimism that agreement on a set of political goals and a strategy to obtain those goals will be easy to achieve. All the major players have differing and often conflicting goals interests and strategies. For a more detailed examination of these conflicting goals see here.
A successful anti-Deash coalition would need to include all the active players, not just NATO. This is not a situation where the West can unilaterally impose its idea of a solution - if there's anything to be learnt from the Iraq disaster, it is surely this. Another example of the problems inherent in coalition building is the position of Syrian President Assad. Some players - the US the Syrian opposition to name just two - insist that Assad cannot be part of the solution, that he must go as part of the solution. Other players - Iran, Russia, Hezbollah etc - take the precisely opposite view and insist he remain in power. So achieving a political consensus isn't going to be easy, even though all parties agree that Deash needs to destroyed. It may be possible to build a coalition around a single goal - the destruction of Deash - though whether the US would be prepared to enter into a formal agreement with the likes of Hezbollah, or the al-Nusra Front (an AQ affiliate) is unclear.
Even if we grant that this political consensus can be reached, and that a military campaign succeeds in its task of destroying Deash as an effective organisation, is this the end of the problem? Sadly the answer is no. Daesh is a representation of an idea, just as Al Quada was. Destroying the organisation doesn't destroy the idea that gives birth to the organisation.
So on top of developing potentially successful strategies to defeat Daesh politically and militarily, there is also a need to develop coalitions and strategies to (a) defeat the underlying ideology, and (b) deal with the social and political problems that cause some to see Islamism as a solution. This will require a radical reshaping of the political and social make-up of the entire region, a shake-up that will be opposed tooth and nail by every vested interest. It is difficult to see a consensus emerging to achieve this. Failure to achieve this consensus will mean the re-emergence of Islamist ideology just as Daesh emerged from the shell of Al Quada following AQ's military defeat.
So I for one am far from optimistic that there is going to be a solution, that it is far more likely that we will see more of the same. The same politicians whom we trust to develop a successful anti-Daesh strategy are those who must also develop strategies to win the ideological war with Islamic fundamentalism, and to re-shape the social and political conditions of the region. There is simply no way that, for example, the Saudis will ever agree to such a strategy. From their perspective it would be suicidal.
I wish I could be more optimistic but there are no realistic reasons to be more optimistic IMHO
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