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FirmhandKY -> RE: The "New Way Forward in Iraq" - Question (8/6/2007 4:36:32 AM)
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quote:
ORIGINAL: caitlyn
This is mostly for Firm Hanky. [;)]
When discussing the surge, you mentioned that the last of the troops have just arrived in theater, which is pretty much true.
Question: When the six-month timetable was discussed, as in, give this six months to work ... did that mean six onths from the arrival of the first troops, which happened literally within days, or did it mean six months from the arrival of all related surge troops.
I honestly don't know the answer, and have been looking for it for a while.
Peace ... cc
caitlyn,
Sorry about the delay. I've got another thread that I need to address as well, but I care more about an honest discussion, than the hype and BS that often goes for discussion around here, so I decided I'd better get back to you first.
In direct response to your question, I'm not sure there ever was a "six month time table" in the way that it seems to be discussed in many of the threads here.
There simply can't be a "time table" to "victory" they way that most who oppose the war try to paint the entire change in strategy. In fact, their attempts to do so indicates either a deep ignorance of the current strategy, or an intentional amount of dissembling in order to press other parts of their agenda.
My understanding all along has been that it would take at least 6 months after the mimimum number of troops were available, and the new strategy had been in effect, to see if there was sufficient good will and opportunity remaining in Iraq to see if the strategy had a likelihood of success.
I did find a reference to "6 months to win the war" in at least one article - a Chinese article:
US 'has 6 months to win in Iraq'
An elite team of officers advising the US commander, General David Petraeus, in Baghdad has concluded that they have six months to win the war in Iraq or face a Vietnam-style collapse in political and public support that could force the military into a hasty retreat.
The officers combat veterans who are experts in counter-insurgency are charged with implementing the "new way forward" strategy announced by US President George W. Bush on January 10. The plan includes a controversial "surge" of 21,500 additional American troops to establish security in the Iraqi capital and Anbar province.
But the team, known as the "Baghdad brains trust" and ensconced in the heavily fortified Green Zone, is struggling to overcome a range of entrenched problems in what has become a race against time, according to a former senior administration official familiar with their deliberations.
"They know they are operating under a clock. They know they are going to hear a lot more talk in Washington about 'Plan B' by the autumn meaning withdrawal. They know the next six-month period is their opportunity. And they say it's getting harder every day," he said.
By improving security, the plan's short-term aim is to create time and space for the Iraqi government to bring rival Shi'ite, Sunni and Kurd factions together in a process of national reconciliation, American officials say. If that works within the stipulated timeframe, longer term schemes for rebuilding Iraq under the so-called "go long" strategy will be set in motion.
But the next six months are make-or-break for the US military and the Iraqi government. The main obstacles confronting General Petraeus's team are:
Insufficient troops on the ground
A "disintegrating" international coalition
An anticipated increase in violence in the south as the British leave
Morale problems as casualties rise
A failure of political will in Washington and/or Baghdad.
"The scene is very tense," the former official said. "They are working round the clock. Endless cups of tea with the Iraqis. But they're still trying to figure out what's the plan. The president is expecting progress. But they're thinking, what does he mean? The plan is changing every minute, as all plans do."
Overall, I think this article sums up the real feelings and problems faced by the US efforts in Iraq, although I think the "win the war in six months" is likely not what was actually said or meant in the sense that many would wish it to mean. What I think they meant was that if we couldn't show any real progress, any real difference in the results of our actions, then for all intents and purposes, we would have to call the war a loss, and plan on redrawing for political reasons. Which I think is an accurate statement.
So, it's really a political question now, and arguments about the exact dates of what troops arrived, and who said how long and when you should start "tracking" any supposed "6 month" window are all really superfluous questions.
The more important question is: Is the new strategy starting to make a difference?
Anti-war opponents will make the arguments that violence has increased (larger body counts in single terrorist incidents) or that the tempo or importance of specific targets indicates a simple failure of the new strategy (i.e. attacks in the Green Zone, or the Iraqi Parliment), but these are actually expected results of a successful strategy, recognized in the planning. For an example, look at this cogent and brief analysis of the strategy made back in January:
Don't confuse the "Surge" with the Strategy
Dave Kilcullen on January 19, 2007 5:29 AM
Much discussion of the new Iraq strategy centers on the “surge” to increase forces in-theater by 21,500 troops. I offer no comment on administration policy here. But as counterinsurgency professionals, it should be clear to us that focusing on the “surge” misses what is actually new in the strategy – its population-centric approach.
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The new strategy reflects counterinsurgency best practice as demonstrated over dozens of campaigns in the last several decades: enemy-centric approaches that focus on the enemy, assuming that killing insurgents is the key task, rarely succeed. Population-centric approaches, that center on protecting local people and gaining their support, succeed more often.
The extra forces are needed because a residential, population-centric strategy demands enough troops per city block to provide real and immediate security. It demands the ability to “flood” areas, and so deter enemy interference with the population. This is less like conventional warfare, and more like a cop patrolling a beat to prevent violent crime.
This does not mean there will be less fighting – indeed, there will probably be more in the short-term, as security forces get in at the grass-roots level and compete for influence with insurgents, sectarian militias and terrorist gangs. But the aim is different: in the new strategy what matters is providing security and order for the population, rather than directly targeting the enemy – though this strategy will effectively marginalize them.
The Anbar Province is a very good example of the success so far of the new strategy. You can google with the best of them. A year ago, it was basically called a loss - dangerous, out of bounds except for well protected units, and largely violent. Today, it's considered a success story, even to the extent that some units are considering reducing the amount of armor and protection they are wearing while out in the towns and civilian neighborhoods.
Even the Brookings Institute is saying that there is a possibility of the strategy working now (even in Baghdad) ... and in the New York Times:
A War We Just Might Win
By MICHAEL E. O’HANLON and KENNETH M. POLLACK
Published: July 30, 2007
VIEWED from Iraq, where we just spent eight days meeting with American and Iraqi military and civilian personnel, the political debate in Washington is surreal. The Bush administration has over four years lost essentially all credibility. Yet now the administration’s critics, in part as a result, seem unaware of the significant changes taking place.
Here is the most important thing Americans need to understand: We are finally getting somewhere in Iraq, at least in military terms. As two analysts who have harshly criticized the Bush administration’s miserable handling of Iraq, we were surprised by the gains we saw and the potential to produce not necessarily “victory” but a sustainable stability that both we and the Iraqis could live with.
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In war, sometimes it’s important to pick the right adversary, and in Iraq we seem to have done so. A major factor in the sudden change in American fortunes has been the outpouring of popular animus against Al Qaeda and other Salafist groups, as well as (to a lesser extent) against Moktada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army.
Read the entire article. These aren't two "neo-cons" or "Bushies", or any other similar ad hominen terms that the anti-war crowd attempts to paint anyone in order to discredit their arguments.
Will the new US strategy "work"? Dunno. I think all indications are that it seems to be accomplishing our goals much better than anything we've tried before, but it is really just at it's beginning stage, and providing security and "winning the hearts" of the population doesn't guarantee a larger political success with the Iraq government.
But this is the first step, and a necessary prerequisite to any such larger political success, and all indications are that it has finally placed us on a path were we can actually hope for success.
That's pretty good, I think.
Firm
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