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FirmhandKY -> RE: John F. Kennedy (8/29/2008 12:20:35 AM)
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quote:
ORIGINAL: MrRodgers
The problem is that Kennedy wasn't ready to go ahead with the Bay of Pigs invasion when Dulles ordered it unlike any previous cabinet member. Kennedy, not ready, never authorized the responsible Air Force general to provide air support. Thus the invasion failed. Dulles was subsequently fired.
The Bay of Pigs was a disaster, and one that could have been avoided.
One of the things it did was send a very bad message to the Soviets about the "character" of Kennedy, and lead to more Soviet misadventurism.
"Defending Cuba" was never the real purpose of the missiles ... it was just a convenient fig leaf.
quote:
ORIGINAL: MrRodgers
Also, many felt that Russia would not have put missiles in Cuba if Kennedy had not ordered the invasion. That is bullshit for the following reasons.
Ballistic missiles were never meant to defend that island or anything as they are offensive weapons. Also, Cuba being the new socialist/communist presence in the hemisphere...Russia jumped in bed with them ONLY for the purposes of puting missiles there in the first place.
Agreed.
One of the direct causes of many of the Cold War crisis during this period was Kennedy's inexperience:
Kennedy Talked, Khrushchev Triumphed
By NATHAN THRALL and JESSE JAMES WILKINS
The New York Times
Extracts:
quote:
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But Kennedy’s one presidential meeting with Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet premier, suggests that there are legitimate reasons to fear negotiating with one’s adversaries. Although Kennedy was keenly aware of some of the risks of such meetings — his Harvard thesis was titled “Appeasement at Munich” — he embarked on a summit meeting with Khrushchev in Vienna in June 1961, a move that would be recorded as one of the more self-destructive American actions of the cold war, and one that contributed to the most dangerous crisis of the nuclear age.
Senior American statesmen like George Kennan advised Kennedy not to rush into a high-level meeting, arguing that Khrushchev had engaged in anti-American propaganda and that the issues at hand could as well be addressed by lower-level diplomats. Kennedy’s own secretary of state, Dean Rusk, had argued much the same in a Foreign Affairs article the previous year: “Is it wise to gamble so heavily? Are not these two men who should be kept apart until others have found a sure meeting ground of accommodation between them?”
But Kennedy went ahead, and for two days he was pummeled by the Soviet leader. Despite his eloquence, Kennedy was no match as a sparring partner, and offered only token resistance as Khrushchev lectured him on the hypocrisy of American foreign policy, cautioned America against supporting “old, moribund, reactionary regimes” and asserted that the United States, which had valiantly risen against the British, now stood “against other peoples following its suit.” Khrushchev used the opportunity of a face-to-face meeting to warn Kennedy that his country could not be intimidated and that it was “very unwise” for the United States to surround the Soviet Union with military bases.
Kennedy’s aides convinced the press at the time that behind closed doors the president was performing well, but American diplomats in attendance, including the ambassador to the Soviet Union, later said they were shocked that Kennedy had taken so much abuse. Paul Nitze, the assistant secretary of defense, said the meeting was “just a disaster.” Khrushchev’s aide, after the first day, said the American president seemed “very inexperienced, even immature.” Khrushchev agreed, noting that the youthful Kennedy was “too intelligent and too weak.” The Soviet leader left Vienna elated — and with a very low opinion of the leader of the free world.
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A little more than two months later, Khrushchev gave the go-ahead to begin erecting what would become the Berlin Wall. Kennedy had resigned himself to it, telling his aides in private that “a wall is a hell of a lot better than a war.” The following spring, Khrushchev made plans to “throw a hedgehog at Uncle Sam’s pants”: nuclear missiles in Cuba. And while there were many factors that led to the missile crisis, it is no exaggeration to say that the impression Khrushchev formed at Vienna — of Kennedy as ineffective — was among them.
Many people remember how Kennedy supposedly "stood up" to the Soviets. Few understand that he was one of the important causes of the problems at the time as well.
"Great"?
Firm
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