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tazzygirl -> RE: Rush Drawing fire for his haitian comments (1/15/2010 5:44:59 PM)
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Hurricane Katrina Task Force Subcommittee Report
The government did have the right. An interesting read. The report was done in 2005. Any who have doubts about governments role during a disaster should read this.
<snip>
When an incident reaches certain proportions, however, and exceeds the
capability of local governments to respond, state or federal support may be needed. The
larger the incident, the more likely it is that state and federal support will be needed.
Inherently, federal assistance will virtually always be needed to respond to catastrophic
events. Authorities for federal emergency and disaster relief are largely structured to
address this sequence of effect and pattern of resource use. They essentially require the
federal government to wait for a request for assistance from the governor of an impacted
state before taking action to assist in the response to the incident in question.
Once such a request has been made, the President has broad powers to bring the
resources of any federal agency to bear in support of the affected locality and state. The
President’s authority to act, however, in the absence of a request from a governor, or in
contravention of a denial by a governor of offered federal assistance, is much more
limited, and requires the exercise of authorities typically reserved only for times of
dissolution of civil order or insurrection.
In the case of Hurricane Katrina, three basic concerns arose concerning
governmental authority to act during the immediate response phase of the disaster. First,
state and federal officials seemed at odds over what the federal government had been
asked to do, what it could do, and what conditions the federal officials would impose on
states before acting. Second, the public seemed confused as to who was “in charge,”
what the involvement of federal active-duty military meant with respect to civilian
control, and what the involvement of a “Principal Federal Official” meant with respect to
concepts of state control. Third, the public seemed concerned that confusion over the
role of the federal government, and the perceived lack of ability of the federal agencies to
act, slowed down the arrival of federal life-saving assistance and security forces, and thus
exacerbated the impact of the incident on the affected populace.
Indeed, press reports indicate that federal, state, and local leaders were not
communicating, and certainly did not appear to be speaking the same language. On
Saturday, August 27, 2005, Louisiana Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco requested,
and received, an emergency declaration from President George W. Bush.6 When
Governor Blanco says that she asked federal officials for “everything you’ve got”7 – and
both President Bush and then-DHS Undersecretary and FEMA Director Mike Brown say
that she did not ask for federal military units or for some National Guard units – were
they speaking the same language? Indeed, when Governor Blanco asked President Bush
for “a significant number of federal troops,” and the President asked the Governor to
place under federal command the Louisiana National Guard and National Guard troops
provided by other states under the Emergency Management Assistance Compact
(EMAC),8 were they talking past each other? DHS is mandated to conduct biannual
exercises, known as “TOPOFF” or Top Official exercises, in order to build relationships
among federal, state, and local leaders, and ensure that these leaders speak the same
language during a catastrophic incident response. Katrina events illustrated that these
planning and preparedness efforts demonstrably were not adequate.
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