|
TreasureKY -> RE: Don't bloody well touch me!!! (11/23/2010 9:30:41 PM)
|
quote:
ORIGINAL: Edwynn
In the last several US bombing attempts there was advance information more than sufficient to stop and arrest the perpetrators but it was either ignored outright or not passed on to the proper security sector. This would never happen in Israel.
The failed attempt last Christmas, from the Washington Post:
quote:
The suspect, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, was added to a catch-all terrorism-related database when his father, a Nigerian banker, reported concerns about his son's "radicalization and associations" to the U.S. Embassy in Nigeria, a senior administration official said. Abdulmutallab was not placed on any watch list for flights into the United States, however, because there was "insufficient derogatory information available" to include him, another administration official said.
He was added to "the big list" of ~ 550,000 but not to the 14,000 'selected' list or 4,000 no-fly list.
It really is worse than even that.
Statement of Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Secretary of State for Management Before the House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary Hearing on Sharing and Analyzing Information to Prevent Terrorism - January 27, 2010
quote:
In the case of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, on the day following his father’s November 19 visit to the Embassy, we sent a cable to the Washington intelligence and law enforcement community through proper channels (the Visas Viper system) that “Information at post suggests [that Farouk] may be involved in Yemeni-based extremists.”
The following piece of transcript from that hearing is preserved on the internet, however the original link to the transcript on LexusNexis shows the document is no longer available. I have been unable to find any other official source, so this information is suspect...
quote:
REP. THOMPSON: Okay. So — all right. So he has a visa. So what does that do? In the process, does it revoke the visa? Does it —
MR. KENNEDY: We — as I mentioned in my statement, Mr. Chairman, if we unilaterally revoked a visa — and there was a case recently up — we have a request from a law enforcement agency to not revoke the visa. We came across information; we said this is a dangerous person. We were ready to revoke the visa. We then went to the community and said, should we revoke this visa? And one of the members — and we’d be glad to give you that out of — in private — said, please do not revoke this visa. We have eyes on this person. We are following this person who has the visa for the purpose of trying roll up an entire network, not just stop one person. So we will revoke the visa of any individual who is a threat to the United States, but we do take one preliminary step. We ask our law enforcement and intelligence community partners, do you have eyes on this person, and so you want us to let this person proceed under your surveillance so that you may potentially break a larger plot?
REP. THOMPSON: Well, I think that the point that I’m trying to get at is, is this just another box you’re checking, or is that some security value to add in that box, to the list?
MR. KENNEDY: The intelligence and law enforcement community tell us that they believe in certain cases that there’s a higher value of them following this person so they can find his or her co-conspirators and roll up an entire plot against the United States, rather than simply knock out one soldier in that effort.
There, however, further testimony by Michael E. Leiter, the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center available here:
quote:
Let’s start with this clear assertion: Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab should not have stepped on that plane. The counterterrorism system failed and we told the President we are determined to do better.
Within the Intelligence Community we had strategic intelligence that al Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) had the intention of taking action against the United States prior to the failed attack on December 25th, but, we did not direct more resources against AQAP, nor insist that the watchlisting criteria be adjusted prior to the event. In addition, the Intelligence Community analysts who were working hard on immediate threats to Americans in Yemen did not understand the fragments of intelligence on what turned out later to be Mr. Abdulmutallab, so they did not push him onto the terrorist watchlist.
There is further testimony by Jane Holl Lute, Deputy Secretary, US Department of Homeland Security here:
quote:
Abdulmutallab was not on the No Fly or Selectee Lists. Accordingly, the carrier was not alerted to prevent him from boarding the flight or additional physical screening, nor did the IAP officer advise Dutch authorities of any concerns.
As with all passengers traveling on that flight, and similar to all other international flights arriving in the United States, CBP evaluated Abdulmutallab’s information while the flight was en route to conduct a preliminary assessment of his admissibility and to determine whether there were requirements for additional inspection. During this assessment, CBP noted that there was a record that had been received from the Department of State, which indicated possible extremist ties. It did not indicate that he had been found to be a threat, or that his visa had been revoked.
The opening remarks, submitted testimony of witnesses, and a video record for the January 27, 2010, U.S. House of Representatives’ Committee on Homeland Security hearing to examine the circumstances surrounding the attempted Christmas day bombing of Northwest Flight 253 is available here.
What is appears to me is that we have several large Federal agencies who failed. Not the airport screening procedures. But who pays the penalty for those failures?
|
|
|
|
