Real0ne
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quote:
ORIGINAL: DarkSteven
Good question.
Obviously, if I can buy something, I have a right to it (as long as it doesn't break a law or harm others). I consider the "list of rights" to be things that humans are entitled to, even if they cannot afford them. In other words, things that must be provided for by welfare if not earned.
Shelter and food are obvious. Life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, freedom of religion, etc., are more internal things than provided ones.
I took the question as being, what sorts of things are so basic to human life that you would pay for others to have them? And the Internet doesn't make that list.
ok here is the short version...
IMO; It is fundamentally a "claim" of "actions" or "things" and the authority to enforce it. By authority I do not mean force I mean in accord with correctness and in accord with the laws of nature and natures God.
So technically pretty much anything can be a right as long as it does not injure another in person or equity, in as much as people are concerned.
RIGHT. A well-founded claim. If people believe that humanity itself establishes or proves certain claims, either upon fellow-beings, or upon society or government, they call these claims human rights; if they believe that these claims inhere in the very nature of man himself, they called them inherent, Inalienable rights; if people believe that there inheres in monarchs a claim to rule over their subjects by divine appointment, they call the claim divine right, jus divinum; if the claim is founded or given by law, it is a legal right. The ideas of claim and that the claim must be well founded always constitute the idea of right
Rights can only Inhere in and exist between moral beings: and no moral beings can coexist without rights, consequently without obligations. [Emphasis: what does that say for atheists]
Right and obligation are correlative ideas. The idea of a well-founded claim becomes in law a claim founded In or established by the law: so that we may say a right In law is an acknowledged claim.
Men are by their inherent nature moral and social beings; they have, therefore, mutual claims upon one another.
Every well grounded claim on others is called a right, and, since the social character of man gives the element of mutuality to each claim, every right conveys along with it the idea of obligation. Right and obligation are correlative. The consciousness of all constitutes the first foundation of the right or makes the claim well grounded.
Its inciplency arises Instinctively out of the nature of man. Man feels that he has a right of ownership over that which he has produced out of appropriated matter, for Instance, the bow be has made of appropriated wood; he feels that he has a right to exact obedience from his children, long before laws formally acknowledge or protect these rights; but he feels, too, that If he claims the bow which he made as his own, he ought to acknowledge (as correlative obligation) the same right in another man to the bow which he may have made; or if he, as father, has a right to the obedience of his children, they have a corresponding claim on him for protection as long as they are incapable to protect themselves.
[Incidently I object to the use of the term "appropriated" as it implies a paramount owner and the person with rights subject to the paramount owner. ]
quote:
appropriatedpast participle, past tense of ap·pro·pri·ate (Verb)1. Take (something) for one's own use, typically without the owner's permission.
The idea of rights is coexistent with that of authority (or government); both are inherent in man; but if we understand by government a coherent system of laws by which a state is ruled, and if we understand by state a sovereign society, with distinct authorities to make and execute laws, then rights precede government, or the establishment of states, which is expressed in the ancient law maxim: Ne ex regula jus sumatur, sed ex jure quod est, rcpula fiat. See Govebnment. We cannot refrain from referring the reader to the noble passage of Sophocles, CEdyp. Tyr. 876 et seq., and to the words of Cicero, In his oration for Mllo:Est enim hwc, judices, non scripta sed nata lex; quam non didicimus, accepimus, legimus; vervm ex natura ipsa arripuimus, hausimus, exprcssimus; ad quam non docti sed facti; non instituti sed itnbuti sumus.
As rights precede government, so we find that now rights are acknowledged above governments and their states, in the case of international law. International law is founded on rights, that is, well-grounded claims which civilized states, as individuals, make upon one another. As governments come to be more and more clearly established, rights are more clearly acknowledged and protected by the laws, and right comes to mean a claim acknowledged and protected by the law.
A legal right, a constitutional right, means a right protected by the law, by the constitution; but government does not create the idea of right or original rights; it acknowledges them; Just as government does not create property or values and money, it acknowledges and regulates them. If it were otherwise, the question would present itself, whence does government come? whence does it derive its own right to create rights? By compact? But whence did the contracting parties derive their right to create a government that is to make rights? We would be consistently led to adopt the idea of a government by jus divinum,—that is, a government deriving its authority to Introduce and establish rights (bestowed on it in particular) from a source wholly separate from human society and the ethical character of man, in the same manner in which we acknowledge revelation to come from a source not human.
Rights are claims of moral beings upon one another: when we speak of rights to certain things, they are, strictly speaking claims of persons on persons,—in the case of property, for instance, the claim of excluding others from possessing it.
The idea of right indicates an ethical relation, and all moral relations may be infringed; claims may be made and established by law which are wrong in themselves and destitute of a corollary obligation; they are like every other wrong done by society or government; they prove nothing concerning the origin or essential character of rights.
On the other hand, claims are gradually more clearly acknowledged, and new ones, which were not perceived in early periods, are for the first time perceived, and surrounded with legislative protection, as civilization advances.
Thus, original rights, or the rights of mail, are not meant to be claims which man has always perceived or insisted upon or protected, but those claims which, according to the person who uses the term, logically flow from the necessity of the physical and moral existence of man; for man is born to be a man,—that is, to lead a human existence.
They have Bouv.—186 been called inalienable rights; but they have been alienated, and many of them are not perceived for long periods. Lieber, in his
Political Ethics, calls them primordial rights: he means rights directly flowing from the nature of man, developed by civilization, and always showing themselves clearer and clearer as society advances. He enumerates, as such especially, the following: the right of protection; the right of personal freedom,— that is, the claim of unrestricted action except so far as the same claim of others necessitates restriction: these two rights involve the right to have justice done by the public administration of Justice, the right of production and exchange (the right of property), the right of free locomotion and emigration, the right of communion In speech, letter, print, the right of worship, the right of influencing or sharing in the legislation. All political civilization steadily tends to bring out these rights clearer and clearer, while in the course of this civilization, from its incipieney, with its relapses, they appear more or less developed in different periods and frequently wholly in abeyance: nevertheless, they have their origin in the personality of man as a social being. Publicists and jurists have made the following further distinction of rights:— Rights are perfect and imperfect.
When the things which we have a right to possess, or the actions we have a right to do, are or may be fixed and determinate, the right is a perfect one; but when the thing or the actions are vague and indeterminate, the right is an imperfect one.
If a man demand his property which is withheld from him, the right that supports his demand is a perfect one, because the thing demanded is or may be fixed and determinate; but if a poor man ask relief from those from whom he has reason to expect it, the right which supports his petition is an Imperfect one, because the relief which he expects is a vague, indeterminate thing. Rutherforth, Inst c. 2, § 4; GroUus, lib. 1. c. 1, §
4. Rights are also absolute and qualified. A man has an absolute right to recover property which belongs to him; an agent has a qualified right to recover such property when it has been intrusted to his care and which has been unlawfully taken out of his possession.
Rights might with propriety be also divided into natural and civil rights; but as all the rights which man has received from nature have been modified and acquired anew from the civil law, it is more proper, when considering their object, to divide them into political and civil rights. Political rights consist in the power to participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or management of government.
These political rights are fixed by the constitution. Every citizen has the right of voting for public officers, and of being elected; these are the political rights which the humblest citizen possesses.
Civil rights are those which have no relation to the establishment, support, or management of the government. These consist in the power of acquiring and enjoying property, of exercising the paternal and marital powers, and the like. It will be observed that every one, unless deprived of them by a sentence of civil death, Is In the enjoyment of his civil rights, —which is not the case with political rights; for an alien, for example, has no political, although In the full enjoyment of his civil, rights. These latter rights are divided Into absolute and relative.
The absolute rights of mankind may be reduced to three principal or primary articles: the right of personal security, which consists in a person's legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation; the right of personal liberty, which consists in the power of locomotion, of changing situation or removing one's person to whatsoever place one's Inclination may direct, without any restraint unless by due course of law; the right of property, which consists In the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions, without any control or diminution save only by the laws of the land. 1 Bla. Com. 124-139.
The relative rights are public or private: the first are those which subsist between the people and the government; as, the right of protection on the part of the people, and the right of allegiance which Is due by the people to the government; the second are the reciprocal rights of husband and wife, parent and child, guardian and ward, master and servant.
Rights are also divided into legal and equitable. The former are those where the party has the legal title to a thing; and In that case his remedy for an infringement of it is by an action in a court of law. Although the person holding the legal title may have no actual interest, but hold only as trustee, the suit must be in his name, and not, in general, in that of the cestui que trust; 8 Term 332; 1 Saund. 15S, n. 1; 2 Bing. 20.
The latter, or equitable rights, are those which may be enforced in a court of equity by the cestui que trust.
RIGHT CLOSE, WRIT OF. An abolished writ which lay for tenants in ancient demesne, and others of a similar nature, to try the right of their lands and tenements in the court of the lord exclusively. 1 Steph. Com. 224.
RIGHT HEIRS. The heirs of the testator at common law, who, if more than one, take as tenants in common. 47 L. J. Ch. 714; 35 W. R. 356.
RIGHT HONOURABLE. Used to designate a member of the British privy council.
RIGHT OF ACTION. The right to bring suit in a case. Also sometimes used in the same sense as right in action, which is identical with chose in action (g. v.).
RIGHT OF APPEAL. This is not limited to a right of appeal by statute, but includes a case where a judge has given leave to appeal. 46 L. J. Q. B. 226; 2 Q. B. D. 125.
RIGHT OF COMMON. See Common. RIGHT OF HABITATION. In Louisiana. The right of dwelling gratuitously in a house the property of another. La. Civ. Code, art 623; 3 Toullier, c. 2, p. 325; 14 id. a. 279, p. 330; Pothier, n. 22-25.
RIGHT OF LIEN. The word Hen is of the same origin as the word liable, and the right of lien expresses the liability of certain property for a certain legal duty, or a right to resort to it in order to enforce the duty. Appeal of Wood, 30 Pa. 277. See Lien.
RIGHT OF POSSESSION. The right to possession which may reside in one man, while another has the actual possession, being the right to enter and turn out such actual occupant: e. g. the right of a disseisee. An apparent right of possession is one which may be defeated by a better; an actual right of possession, one which will stand the test against all opponents. 2 Bla. Com. *196.
RIGHT OF PROPERTY. The abstract right (merum jus) which remains after the actual possession has been so long gone that the right of possession Is also lost, and the law will only allow recovery of the land by a writ of right It, together with possession and right of possession, makes a perfect title; e. g. a disseisor has naked possession, the disseisee has right of possession and right of property. But after twenty years without entry the right of possession is transferred from the disseisee to the disseisor; and if he now buys up the right of property which alone remains in the disseisee, the disseisor will unite all three rights in himself, and thereby acquire a perfect title. 2 Bla. Com. ♦197.
< Message edited by Real0ne -- 2/1/2011 11:10:03 AM >
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RE: UN- Internet- a human "right"? - 
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