Real0ne
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quote:
ORIGINAL: Musicmystery
quote:
Sorry, Natural Law is that which is law simply because it is.
Sorry, no it isn't. Nor is Natural Law the basis for the Declaration in any substantial way:
In jurisprudence and political philosophy, a system of right or justice common to all humankind and derived from nature rather than from the rules of society, or positive law. The concept can be traced to Aristotle, who held that what was "just by nature" was not always the same as what was "just by law." In one form or another, the existence of natural law was asserted by the Stoics (see Stoicism), Cicero, the Roman jurists, St. Paul, St. Augustine, Gratian, St. Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, William of Ockham, and Francisco Suárez. In the modern period, Hugo Grotius insisted on the validity of natural law even on the assumption that God does not exist, and Thomas Hobbes defined a law of nature as "a precept of general rule found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that which is destructive of his life." Hobbes attempted to construct an edifice of law by rational deduction from a hypothetical "state of nature" and a social contract of consent between rulers and subjects. John Locke departed from Hobbes in describing the state of nature as an early society in which free and equal men observe the natural law. Jean-Jacques Rousseau postulated a savage who was virtuous in isolation and actuated by two principles "prior to reason": self-preservation and compassion. The authors of the U.S. Declaration of Independence refer only briefly to "the Laws of Nature" before citing equality and other "unalienable" rights as "self-evident." The French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen asserts liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression as "imprescriptible natural rights." Interest in the concept of natural law declined dramatically in the 19th century, partly as a result of skeptical attacks by Jeremy Bentham and other proponents of utilitarianism; it was revived in the mid-20th century in light of the crimes committed by the Nazi regime during World War II. Skepticism of natural law and natural rights remained strong, however, and later writers almost invariably talked of human rights rather than natural rights.
Britannica Concise Encyclopedia: natural law
Read more: http://www.answers.com/topic/natural-law#ixzz1oIqSCO2E
Sorry yes it is and yes it is.
If you want to quote law try a LAW dictionary not some dipshit from answers dot com!
This is where the bear shit in the buckwheat! LOL
quote:
RIGHT. A well-founded claim.
2.
If people believe that humanity itself establishes or proves certain claims, either upon fellow-beings, or npon society or government, they call these claims human rights;
if people believe that those claims inhere in the very nature of man himself, they call them inherent, inalienable rights;
if people believe that there inheres in monarchs a claim to rule over their subjects by divine appointment, they call the claim divine right;
if the claim is founded or given by law, it is a legal right.
The ideas of claim and that the claim must be well founded always constitute the idea of right.
Rights can only inhere in and exist between moral beings; (not corporations, entities, and other artifices)
no moral beings can coexist without rights, consequently without obligations.
Right and obligation are correlative ideas.
The idea of a well-founded claim becomes in law a claim founded in or established by the law: so that we may say a right in law is an acknowledged claim.
Men are by their inherent nature moral and social beings:
they have, therefore, mutual claims upon one another.
Every well-grounded claim on others is called a right, and, since the social character of man gives the element of mutuality to each claim, every right conveys along with it the idea of obligation.
Right and obligation are correlatives.
The consciousness of all constitutes the first foundation of the right or makes the claim well grounded.
Its incipienoy arises instinctively out of the nature of man.
Man feels that he has a right of ownership over that which he has produced out of appropriated matter,—for instance, the bow he has made of appropriated wood; he feels that he has a right to exact obedience from his children, long before laws formally acknowledge or protect these rights; but he feels, too, that if he claims the bow which he made as his own, he ought to acknowledge (as correlative obligation) the same right in another man to the bow which he may have made; or if he, as father, has a right to the obedience of his children, they have a corresponding claim on him for protection as long as they are incapable to protect themselves.
The idea of rights is coexistent with that of authority (or government); both are inherent in man; but if we understand by government a coherent system of laws by which a state is ruled, and if we understand by state a sovereign society, with distinct authorities to make and execute laws, then rights precede government, or the establishment of states, which is expressed in the ancient law maxim: Ne ex rcgitla jut tumatur, ted ex jure quod est, regula fiat.
See Government. We cannot refrain from referring the reader to the noble passage of Sophocles, (Edyp. Tyr. 876 el teq., and to the words of Cicero, in his oration for Milo: Est enim hsec, judices, non scripta sed nata lex; quam non didicimus, acocpimus, legimus; verum ex natura ipsa arripuimus, hausimus, expressimus; ad quam non docti sed facti; non instituti sed imbuti sumns.
3.
As rights precede government, so we find that now rights are acknowledged above governments and their states, in the case of international law. International law is founded on rights, that is, well-grounded claims which civilized states, as individuals, make upon one another. As governments come to be more and more dearly established, rights are more dearly acknowledged and protected by the laws, and right comes to mean a claim acknowledged and protected by the law.
A legal right, a constitutional right, means a right protected by the law, by the constitution; but government does not create the idea of right or original rights; it acknowledges them; just as government does not create property or values and money, it acknowledges and regulates them. If it were otherwise, the question would present itself, whence does government come? whence does it derive its own right to create rights? By compact? But whenoe did the contracting parties derive their right to create a government that is to make righta? We would be consistently led to adopt the idea of a government by jus divinum,—that is, a government deriving its authority to introduce and establish rights (bestowed on it in particular) from a source wholly separate from human society and the ethical character of man, in the same manner in which we acknowledge revelation to come from a source not human.
4.
Rights are claims of moral beings npon one another: when we speak of rights to certain things, they are, strictly speaking, olaims of persons on persons,—in the case of property, for instance, the claim of excluding others from possessing it. The idea of right indicates an ethical relation, and all moral relations may be infringed; olaims may be made and established by law which are wrong in themselves and destitute of a corollary obligation; they are like every other wrong done by society or government; they prove nothing concerning the origin or essential oharacter of rights. On the other hand, claims are gradually more clearly acknowledged, and new ones, which were not perceived in early periods, are for the first time perceived, and surrounded with legislative protection, as civilization advances. Thus, original rights, or the rights of man, are not meant to be claims which man has always perceived or insisted npon or protected, but those claims which, according to the person who uses the term, logically flow from the necessity of the physical and moral existence of man ; for man is born to be a man,—that is, to lead a human existenoe. They have been called inalienable rights; but they have been alienated, and many of them are not perceived for long periods. Lieber, in his Political Ethics, calls them primordial rights: he means rights directly flowing from the nature of man, developed by civilization, and always showing themselves dearer and clearer as society advances. He enumerates, as sueh especially, the following: the right of protection; the right of personal freedom,—that is, the claim of unrestricted action except so far as the same olaim of others necessitates restriction: those two rights involve the right to have justice done by the public administration of justice, the right of production and exchange (the right of property), the right of free locomotion and emigration, the right of communion in speech, letter, print, the right of worship, the right of influencing or sharing in the legislation. All politioal civilization steadily tends to bring out these rights clearer and clearer, while in the course of this civilization, from its incipienoy, with its relapses, they appear more or less developed in different periods and frequently wholly in abeyance: nevertheless, they have their origin in the personality of man as a social being.
Publicists and jurists have made the following further distinction of rights:
5. Rights are perfect and imperfect. When the things which we have a right to possess, or the actions we have a right to do, are or may be fixed and determinate, the right is a perfect one; but when the thing or the actions are vague and indeterminate, the right is an imperfect one. If a man demand his property which is withheld from him, the right that supports his demand is a perfect one, because the thing demanded is or may be fixed and determinate; but if a poor man ask relief from those from whom he has reason to expect it, the right which supports his petition is an imperfect one, because the relief which he expects is a vague, indeterminate thing. Rutherforth, Inst. c. 2, § 4; Grotius, lib. 1, c. 1, \ 4.
6.
Rights are also absolute and qualified. A man has an absolute right to recover property which belongs to him; an agent has a qualified right to recover such property when it had been intrusted to his care, and which has been unlawfully taken out of his possession.
Rights might with propriety be also divided into natural and civil nghta; but as all the rights which man has received from nature have been modified and acquired anew from the civil law, it is more proper, when considering their object, to divide them into political and civil righto.
7.
Political rights consist in the power to participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or management of government. These political rights are fixed by the constitution. Every citizen has the right of voting for public officers, and of being elected: these are the political rights which the humblest citizen possesses.
Civil rights are those which have no relation to the establishment, support, or management of the government. These consist in the power of acquiring and enjoying property, of exercising the paternal and marital powers, and the like. It will be observed that every one, unless deprived of them by a sentence of civil death, is in the enjoyment of his civil rights,—which is not the case with political rights; for an alien, for example, has no political, although in the full enjoyment of his civil, rights.
8.
These latter rights are divided into absolute and relative. The absolute rights of mankind may be reduced to three principal or primary articles: the right of personal security, which consists in a person's legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation; the right of personal liberty, which consists in the power of locomotion, of changing situation or removing one's person to whatsoever place one's inclination may direct, without any restraint unless by due course of law; the right of property, which consists in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions, without any control or diminution save only by the laws of the land. 1 Blackstone, Comm. 124-139.
9.
The relative rights are public or private: the first are those which subsist between the people and the government; as, the right of protection on the part of the people, and the right of allegiance which is due by the people to the government; the second are the reciprocal rights of husband and wife, parent and child, guardian and ward, and master and servant.
Rights are also divided into legal and equitable.
The former are those where the party has the legal title to a thing; and in that case his remedy for an infringement of it is by an action in a court of law. Although the person holding the legal title may have no actual interest, but hold only as trustee, the suit must be in his name, and not, in general, in that of the cestui que trust. 1 East, 497; 8 Term, 332; 1 Saund, 158, n. 1; 2 Bingh. 20. The latter, or equitable rights, are those which may be enforced in a court of equity by the cestui que trust.
so who ever that original quote belonged to. is correct!
< Message edited by Real0ne -- 3/5/2012 8:33:08 PM >
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