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Mupainurpleasure -> RE: The Desert One Debacle (4/26/2012 8:45:44 PM)
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quote:
ORIGINAL: BamaD
The choppers failed because the air filters clogged up. This had happened every time they practiced. I don't believe anyone was supposed to die but they were sent out there to fail so Carter could claimto have proven that no military option would work.
nah we really didnt understand the extreme enviorment of sand. I have first hand experiences with the fixes to correct the miscalculation in desert storm. your point is contradicted by facts. It is a fiction. You mknow reagan called them that day and warned them...just as supported as your statemnent and just as true
http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/hollowayrpt.htm
I'd like to point out that not all of these 23 issues were criticisms per se. In some cases the Group concluded that with respect to the questions raised on an issue, there was no better way of handling the problem, or what was done had little or no influence on the outcome. However, since our purpose was to help identify lessons learned for future application, we included in our report all that we considered significant. Quite frankly, we were apprehensive that the critical tone which this resulted in could be misinterpreted as an indictment of the able and brave men who planned and executed this operation. As is stated in the Forwarding Section of the unclassified report, we encountered not a shred of evidence of culpable neglect or incompetence.
It was recognized at the outset that it might be difficult to reach a group consensus, either in the analysis or in the findings. So we agreed that minority positions would be included if necessary in out final report. In retrospect, I find it interesting that what we finally achieved represented the unanimous views of the members of the Group. There were no dissenting footnotes in what we conveyed to the Joint Chiefs!
Turning to our findings, let me quickly run over the more significant items. These are highlighted in the Executive Summary, and developed more fully in the Conclusions section.
The concept of a small clandestine operation was valid and consistent with national policy objectives. It offered the best chance of getting the hostages out alive and the least danger of a war with Iran.
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The operation was feasible. It probably represented the plan with the best chance of success under the circumstances, and the decision to execute was justified.
The rescue mission was a high-risk operation. People and equipment were called on to perform at the upper limits of human capacity and equipment capability.
The first realistic capability to successfully accomplish the rescue of hostages was reached at the end of March.
OPSEC [Operational Security] was an overriding requirement for a successful operation. Success was totally dependent upon maintaining secrecy.
Command and control was excellent at the upper echelons, but became more tenuous and fragile at the intermediate levels. Command relationships below the Commander, JTF [Joint Task Force], were not clearly emphasized in some cases and were susceptible to misunderstandings under pressure.
External resources adequately supported the JTF and were not a limiting factor.
Planning was adequate except for a number of backup helicopters and provisions for weather contingencies. A larger helicopter force and better provisions for weather penetration would have increased the probability of mission success.
Preparation for the mission was adequate except for the lack of a comprehensive, full-scale training exercise. Operational readiness of the force would have benefited from a full-dress rehearsal. Command and control weaknesses probably would have surfaced and been ironed out.
Two factors combined to directly cause the mission abort: unexpected helicopter failure rate and low-visibility flight conditions en route to Desert One.
These conclusions lead the Group to recommend that:
-a Counterterrorist Joint Task Force (CTJTF) be established as a field agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with permanently assigned staff personnel and certain assigned forces.
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- the Joint Chiefs of Staff give careful consideration to the establishment of a Special Operations Advisory Panel, comprised of a group of carefully selected high-ranking officers (active and/or retired) who have career backgrounds in special operations or who have served at the CINC or JCS levels and who have maintained a current interest in special operations or defense policy matters.
Before closing, let me make a couple of very important points.
First, the group unanimously concluded that no one action or lack of action caused the operation to fail -- and conversely, no one of our identified alternatives or all the alternatives could have guaranteed success.
Second, as I mentioned earlier, we unanimously agreed that the people who commanded, planned, and executed the operation were the most competent and best qualified for the task of all available. There were none better.
In closing, I would ask that as you read this report, keep in mind its purposes and its context:
-it's a professional critique of the Iranian hostage rescue operation, addressed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- by its very nature, any critique of this sort has to appear highly critical, since it can't allow any potential area of possible future improvement to go unquestioned.
- it's produced with the benefit of hindsight.
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