DesideriScuri -> RE: U.S. debt load falling at fastest pace since 1950s (6/10/2012 8:38:22 PM)
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ORIGINAL: Owner59 quote:
ORIGINAL: DesideriScuri Um, did homeowners get forced into signing on the dotted line for those ARM's? The only real problem with the derivatives is that no one truly knew which derivatives had the shitty loans, or which loans within the derivative was shitty. Knowing that there was a very small % of loans out that were shitty gave everyone investing in them puckered sphincters, and the value of the derivatives dropped like a rock, regardless of the quality of the loans inside. There just weren't *that many* shitty loans out there, but enough to ruin the entire derivatives market. There is nothing wrong with an ARM. Nothing at all. It can be a useful too, to be honest. I signed for a 5 year ARM that would break into a 30 year fixed rate. I had planned on moving in 3-5 years, so I would never have to see that increased rate. I move 6 months prior to the ARM breaking. Was that ARM usury? This is, once again, not holding people responsible for their actions. Did mortgage companies do wrong? Yes, and they should be punished for their wrongdoing. Did they all do wrong? No. Did the ones that did wrong always do wrong? No. They should be punished for those instances where they defrauded the lendee. The people who signed ARM's that got screwed when they ARM's broke and they didn't realize what was going to happen should bear the consequences of their choices (except in the cases where the lenders were guilty of fraud and/or misconduct). Was I happy people weren't able to meet their obligations? No. Absolutely not. Was it my fault? No. Now, every taxpayer is bearing the consequences of the few while mortgage lenders are being demonized, regardless of whether their actions were worthy of that criticism. Cheer on the shedding of debt. Will it make the recovery more difficult? Perhaps a little. What would happen if today's lower level of consumption is the new norm? Business will take it on the chin and have to deal with it. The victims were duped with the promise of another re-fi in a couple years. A fucking lie in most cases. Predatory loans were by design.....meant to fail . With the loan maker getting a bigger take(from a higher interest rate to foreclosing and taking everything) and the loan taker paying a higher rate. A house of cards that wasn`t the fault of Fanny May or Freddy but went to the very heart our financial institutions. It was private banks that put us in the ditch and it was private banks that bush nationalized in the summer of '08'. You must have been out of the country then or you would have caught it. Two things: 1. I absolutely detested the bank bailouts that Bush started in the Spring of '08. Absolutely horrified at his actions. Do not attempt to use his fuck up with the bank bailouts against me. 2. http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/commentary/2009/0509.cfm quote:
"If we compare the performance of adjustable- and fixed-rate loans by year of origination (which keeps new and old loans separate), we find that FRMs [Fixed Rate Mortgages] originated in 2006 and 2007 had 2.6 and 3.5 times more delinquent loans within one year of origination, respectively, than those originated in 2003. Likewise, ARMs [Adjustable Rate Mortgages] originated in 2006 and 2007 had 2.3 times and 2.7 times more delinquent loans one year after origination, respectively, than those originated in 2003. In short, FRMs showed as many signs of distress as did ARMs. These signs for both types of mortgage were there at the same time; it is not correct to conclude that FRMs started facing larger foreclosure rates after the crisis was initiated by the ARMs." Fuck it. More than 2 things. 3. http://home.howstuffworks.com/real-estate/number-one-reason-for-foreclosure1.htm quote:
"But what came first? Foreclosures or dropping home values? The Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) says it's a two-way street. A 2007 study released by this office also found a high correlation between falling house prices and rising foreclosure rates. Homeowners are more likely to default on their mortgage when the value of the property is less than the loan balance, suggesting that lower prices drive foreclosures. But foreclosures can also lead to lower values because there's an oversupply of houses on the market [source: OFHEO]." 4. http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/09/03/Demyanyk.pdf quote:
"All holders of mortgage contracts, regardless of type, have three options: keep their payments current, prepay (usually through refinancing), or default on the loan. The latter two options terminate the loan. The termination rates of subprime mortgages that originated each year from 2001 through 2006 are surprisingly similar: about 20, 50, and 80 percent, respectively, at one, two, and three years after origination. For loans originated when house prices appreciated the most, terminations were dominated by prepayments. For loans originated when the housing market slowed, defaults dominated. The similarity of the loan termination rates for all vintages in the sample suggests that subprime mortgage loans were intended to be “bridge” (i.e., temporary) loans. In addition, between 2001 and 2006, the number of terminated subprime purchase-money loans (loans used to purchase rather than refinance a house) outweighed the estimated number of first-time-homebuyers with subprime mortgages. The effect of the subprime lending on the increase of homeownership in the United States—a potentially positive outcome of subprime mortgages—most likely has been overstated. (JEL D12, G1, G21) Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, March/April 2009, 91(2), pp. 79-93. 5. http://www.econ.wayne.edu/agoodman/7500/meltdown/Foote.pdf quote:
"Using two large proprietary datasets from New England, this paper establishes some basic facts about the subprime crisis. First, while unaffordable interest-rate resets are often blamed for setting off this crisis, most subprime borrowers who defaulted did so well in advance of their reset dates. Defaults on subprime adjustable-rate mortgages are more sensitive to declining housing prices than are defaults on fixed-rate loans, however, and the data support a number of alternative explanations for this finding. Second, many borrowers with good credit scores took out subprime loans as the housing boom gathered steam. It is hard to construct a prima facie case that these borrowers were inappropriately steered into the subprime market, however, because the loans that these borrowers took out were too risky for prime treatment. Finally, 70% of Massachusetts homes recently lost to foreclosure were originally purchased with prime mortgages. But subprime refinancing is especially prevalent among owners who were likely to have extracted substantial amounts of equity before they defaulted."
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