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vincentML -> RE: Pugsly of North Korea (4/2/2013 1:56:06 PM)
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quote:
A close analysis of the line that seperates n. and s.will show a distinct pimple jutting into the north...that pimple is where the u.s. gets a significant portion of it's tungstin.
I was not aware of the tungsten. Thank you. Canada and the United States have significant tunsten resources. For me to believe we went to war in Korea over tungsten I would have to see data of imports from that era. Tungsten was mined in Korea as early as 1916. The mining was hardly limited to a small portion of one provence. I would be interested in what info you have.
quote:
The justification for u.s. boots on the ground is from ww2 then by that logic the russians should have troops there also.
Right! They did. I SNIPED a few places in the SOURCE but the basic information is the same.
The Soviet 25th Army took part in the Soviet advance into northern Korea immediately after World War II had ended, and was headquartered at Pyongyang for a period. Like the American forces in the south, Soviet troops remained in Korea after the end of the war to rebuild the country.[1]
SNIP
Owing to the nature of the conflict, it was necessary to hide (at least officially) Soviet participation so it could not be seen to be contravening the UN declaration in against North Korean aggression.
SNIP
Both the Chinese and North Korean air forces were structured and equipped along Soviet lines because of the help that the Soviet Union had given them in their first years. In October 1950, the Chinese air force comprised only two fighter divisions, one bomber regiment, and one attack aircraft regiment (a total of two hundred combat planes)[9] and was very much in its infancy. The Chinese committed several Air Regiments to Korea, and these were equipped with the Soviet-supplied MiG 15 fighters, however lack of training meant that the Chinese high command was anxious for Soviet pilots, some of whom were already in China tasked with training the pilots for the Chinese air force.[9] Frustrated by the quality and shortage of Chinese pilots, in April 1951, Stalin took the decision to involve Soviet airforce pilots in the war, flying under the markings of the Chinese People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) or North Korean Peoples' Army Air Force (KPAAF).
In addition to the widely known MiG-15 force of 64th Fighter Corps, there were also significant anti-aircraft gun, searchlight and technical units despatched to Korea as part of the same unit.[7]
Soviet pilots were active in Korea from April 1951. In order to hide this direct Soviet intervention, precautions were taken to disguise their involvement, open knowledge of which would have been a major diplomatic embarrassment for the USSR.
Soviet pilots wore Chinese uniforms when flying, whilst rules were prescribed to stop Sovet pilots flying near the coast or front lines (where they might be captured if shot down) and from speaking Russian on the aircraft radio. All aircraft flown carried Chinese or North Korean markings.[10] When not flying, for reasons of ethnicity, on the ground Soviet pilots 'played' the roles of Soviet commercial travellers rather than Chinese or North Korean soldiers.
Soviet pilots flying MiG 15 jets participated in battles around the Yalu River Valley on the Chinese-Korean border in the area known as "Mig Alley" and in operations against UN "trainbusting" attacks in Northern Korea, with considerable success.
The lack of a shared language between Soviet, Chinese and North Korean pilots frequently led to incidences of friendly fire as other MiG fighters were mistaken for American F-86 Sabre jets and shot down.[11]
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