Phydeaux
Posts: 4828
Joined: 1/4/2004 Status: offline
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quote:
ORIGINAL: DomKen quote:
ORIGINAL: Phydeaux So you agree the failed policy had its roots under clinton (1993). Good. We're starting to make progress. No. I'm just making the point that the law you attack was not the cause as proved by the evidence. That of course is the case since there was no such thing as the Community Redevelopment Act. Maybe you meant the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 or maybe you simply made it up as usual? quote:
So now - please tell me exactly what republican policy resulted in the mass defaults. I'm all ears. Failing to enforce numerous laws against predatory lending including the CRA of 1977. Also the failure of the SEC and banking inspectors to enforce laws on securities and on bank reserves. So now that we have established that you don't know shit about another subject... Oh, so sorry. Proposed in 1993, and passed in 1995. Legislative changes 1992 Although minor amendments were made directly to the Community Reinvestment Act concerning the consideration of minority and female owned institutions & partnerships during evaluations first established in 1991, other portions of the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992 indirectly affected the CRA practices at the time in requiring Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two government sponsored enterprises that purchase and securitize mortgages, to devote a percentage of their lending to support affordable housing.[4] Legislative changes 1994 The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, which repealed restrictions on interstate banking, listed the Community Reinvestment Act ratings received by the out-of-state bank as a consideration when determining whether to allow interstate branches.[49][50] According to Bernanke, a surge in bank merger and acquisition activities followed the passing of the act, and advocacy groups increasingly used the public comment process to protest bank applications on Community Reinvestment Act grounds. When applications were highly contested, federal agencies held public hearings to allow public comment on the bank's lending record. In response many institutions established separate business units and subsidiary corporations to facilitate CRA-related lending. Local and regional public-private partnerships and multi-bank loan consortia were formed to expand and manage such CRA-related lending.[4] Regulatory changes 1995 In July 1993, President Bill Clinton asked regulators to reform the CRA in order to make examinations more consistent, clarify performance standards, and reduce cost and compliance burden.[51] Robert Rubin, the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, under President Clinton, explained that this was in line with President Clinton's strategy to "deal with the problems of the inner city and distressed rural communities". Discussing the reasons for the Clinton administration's proposal to strengthen the CRA and further reduce red-lining, Lloyd Bentsen, Secretary of the Treasury at that time, affirmed his belief that availability of credit should not depend on where a person lives, "The only thing that ought to matter on a loan application is whether or not you can pay it back, not where you live." Bentsen said that the proposed changes would "make it easier for lenders to show how they're complying with the Community Reinvestment Act", and "cut back a lot of the paperwork and the cost on small business loans".[36] By early 1995, the proposed CRA regulations were substantially revised to address criticisms that the regulations, and the agencies' implementation of them through the examination process to date, were too process-oriented, burdensome, and not sufficiently focused on actual results.[52] The CRA examination process itself was reformed to incorporate the pending changes.[40] Information about banking institutions' CRA ratings was made available via web page for public review as well.[36] The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) also moved to revise its regulation structure allowing lenders subject to the CRA to claim community development loan credits for loans made to help finance the environmental cleanup or redevelopment of industrial sites when it was part of an effort to revitalize the low- and moderate-income community where the site was located.[53] During one of the Congressional hearings addressing the proposed changes in 1995, William A. Niskanen, chair of the Cato Institute, criticized both the 1993 and 1994 sets of proposals for political favoritism in allocating credit, for micromanagement by regulators and for the lack of assurances that banks would not be expected to operate at a loss to achieve CRA compliance. He predicted the proposed changes would be very costly to the economy and the banking system in general. Niskanen believed that the primary long term effect would be an artificial contraction of the banking system. Niskanen recommended Congress repeal the Act.[54] Niskanen's, and other respondents to the proposed changes, voiced their concerns during the public comment & testimony periods in late 1993 through early 1995. In response to the aggregate concerns recorded by then, the Federal financial supervisory agencies (the OCC, FRB, FDIC, and OTS) made further clarifications relating to definition, assessment, ratings and scope; sufficiently resolving many of the issues raised in the process. The agencies jointly reported their final amended regulations for implementing the Community Reinvestment Act in the Federal Register on May 4, 1995. The final amended regulations replaced the existing CRA regulations in their entirety.[55] (See the notes in the "1995" column of Table I. for the specifics)
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