Zonie63
Posts: 2826
Joined: 4/25/2011 From: The Old Pueblo Status: offline
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quote:
ORIGINAL: NorthernGent As said, as we're not one nation we don't believe we should be compelled to be part of a system aiming to spread the wealth across Europe. There are a few issues with a central European authority, and they all have their roots in values and being in the master in your own home. I agree, although the idea of "home" is also a hotly debated topic. In America, a lot of anti-immigration arguments surround the idea that "America is our home," but others believe "this used to be someone else's home" and call into question America's sovereign rights on her own territory. There's also the view that the entire planet is everyone's home, which is also tied in to globalism and international economics. quote:
ORIGINAL: NorthernGent The British Government were in it as a common trade market and that was certainly how it was sold to the British people. As a measure of thought and background around that time, think it was 1974, liberals and conservatives were all for it and the left was against it; which would support the view that it was a trade venture. The coal and steel thing was a German-Franco initiative, although I do agree that it was felt such economic ties would engender binding political ties. Not sure why the left would have opposed it, unless they believed it would hurt workers within Britain. In America, that's why most of the opposition to NAFTA came from the Democratic left, while the Republican right was universally and unanimously for it. quote:
ORIGINAL: NorthernGent I think Wilson was absolutely correct. A couple of gangs got together and attempted to carve up Africa, the Middle East and parts of Europe; in their interests. And, to preserve these interests they formed alliances to strengthen their position. Problem being that the concept of 'honour' was a big thing if you wanted to be taken seriously and maintain your partners, and so once the fuse was lit it meant these alliances were more than difficult to unravel. And, a good idea on the part of the Americans to put something in place aimed at something along the lines of an international law to which all nations are bound. I think it was also a matter of other countries feeling like they got the short end of the stick. This was especially true in Germany after they made short work of France in 1871. They figured that they were stronger than France and should have been able to take French colonies if they wanted. In 1905, they wanted to grab French Morocco, but the British interceded on France's behalf which forced the Germans to back down. They also looked at Russia and viewed them in the same way the British looked at India. They thought that since they were strong, they should be able to take whatever they want from weaker countries, just as the British had done. I think the Germans respected the British Empire, but they couldn't understand why Britain kept interfering and trying to mess up their deal. Why should the British care what happens to France or Russia - or even Belgium for that matter? The British position seemed to contradict itself, which no doubt confused the Germans greatly. After those "gangs" carved up Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and elsewhere, they then declared, "Okay, FROM NOW ON, everyone has to play nice." Yeah, after they've stolen most everything for themselves, it comes off as quite the "noble" gesture. quote:
Yeah, I tend to think ideas is more of the root cause than commerce. Clearly, if other people take on board your ideas then there certainly is a commercial benefit as they'll trade with you. Ultimately, though, I do agree that I think these people, Britain included, think that they're making the world safe by forcing our ideas upon them. I can see the theoretical merit to such a view, but again, the problem comes in implementation and how the ideas are put into practice. We ostensibly believed in "free commerce," but only for us - our cronies, our good ol' boy networks. It couldn't be considered fair and equitable across the board. In our dealings with other governments, we had our own favorites we preferred to deal with - people who might be considered toadies and friendliest to US interests, but not necessarily the best person for the job or one who could really get things done. Even in the world of commerce, loyalty may be viewed as a more valuable resource than competence. Elbert Hubbard wrote that "an ounce of loyalty is worth a pound of cleverness." That philosophy dominated US business culture for most of the last century, although it doesn't seem to be as valued anymore - not like it used to be. When the idea is applied to foreign governments we want to do business with, then we have to see where their loyalties lie and whether or not they can be trusted. Sure, everyone wants to do commerce and make money, but the main reason wars happen is because neither side can trust each other anymore. quote:
I think there's a good evidence to suggest that England is a contained country in that the vast majority of the people couldn't care less what is going on in the world and what systems they have in place, and from reading social history it doesn't seem to have been any different during the 17/18/1900s. But, the people who run our country today and in years gone by do believe it is beholden upon them to spread English values. As an example, to get the people on board for WW1 the Belgium issue was a god-send as then they were able to sell it as standing up for 'plucky Belgium'. I can't remember which politicians were involved, but in the run up to WW1 a senior French politician was told by a British counter-part that a war over something in the Balkans would not wash with the British people so be careful in the event you're banking on our support. I've also read that the British press also may have emphasized and perhaps even exaggerated stories of German atrocities in Belgium, which also infuriated a lot of Americans as well. But Americans didn't really see it as any real immediate threat to our territory. We believed our best bet was to just stay out. Teddy Roosevelt thought we should have gone to war with Germany right away, but public opinion more heavily favored neutrality and "no foreign entanglements." But after the Lusitania, then the Zimmerman Note, the Kaiser's declaration of open submarine warfare was pretty much the straw that broke our camel's back. Americans were also getting a lot more press reports from the war, as Trans-Atlantic communication was a lot quicker than it was during most of the previous century. The overthrow of the Tsarist government in Russia also bolstered Wilson's position that this was a war to save democracy, since the new Russian Provisional Government was selected by the Duma and was on board with the idea of making Russia into a democratic republic. Kerensky wanted a system more like the British, where they would still have a Tsar, but more like a constitutional monarchy where the Duma would have most of the actual power. But Kerensky's main problem was the war itself, as Tsarist mismanagement made the war into an utter disaster from the Russian point of view. This is where the true colors of the Allied cause might have been revealed, since the Russians just wanted out of the war, advocating peace "without annexations or indemnities." They had had enough. They were losing badly, and they just wanted out. Their idea was to just quit fighting and that the borders of Europe go back to the way they were before the war started. The British and the French didn't want that; they wanted to fight on to the bitter end and force Germany's unconditional surrender. The whole idea of war aims became a sticky point. After all, if the entire reason for Britain to go to war with Germany was over Belgium, then if Germany could be persuaded to withdraw from Belgium and other territories they occupied, wouldn't that have been a satisfactory concession to end the war? Why wouldn't that have been enough to satisfy the Western Allies? If wasn't enough, then it calls into question the original pretexts for fighting the war in the first place.
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