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Real0ne -> RE: Sandra Bland / I will light you up. (7/28/2015 8:35:19 PM)
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ORIGINAL: lovmuffin
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ORIGINAL: Real0ne
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ORIGINAL: kdsub
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Ok I just checked, her mug shot in that video, [the one with her eyes open] has clearly been been photoshopped. (pretty poor job I might add)
May I ask how on such a low resolution picture you base your " clearly Photoshopped claim? What in your opinion are the tell tail signs of manipulation.
Butch
gotta put it in picture editing software and use filters. the one with the eyes open is either 1) a fake or 2) made to look like a fake. the one with the eyes closed has no anomolies that stick out like a sore thumb. If it is fake is a damn good one. (not that it cant be done it sure can just takes a hell of a lot of work to get it right)
Are you experienced enough with photoshop to definitively say it was done to the first image in your earlier post ? As far as the second image goes it's all too common for someone to blink because of the flash or happenstance. There's a whole lot of live people this happens to thus getting that zombie look or with the eyes all the way closed. Can you say for sure she was dead in that image ?
I kind of ranted on some cops in my earlier post in this thread. In general I'm not taking it back. I still don't like out of control cops or militarization of law enforcement. However, based on facts that have now come to light (thanks Kirata for bringing up freakin inconvenient facts once again and excellent research as usual) I may have been a bit harsh IMO of the officer involved.
its not a blank check however
PATRICK KNOWLES, PETITIONER v. IOWA
Knowles was stopped in Newton, Iowa, after having been clocked driving 43 miles per hour on a road where the speed limit was 25 miles per hour. The police officer issued a citation to Knowles, although under Iowa law he might have arrested him. The officer then conducted a full search of the car, and under the driver’s seat he found a bag of marijuana and a “pot pipe.” Knowles was then arrested and charged with violation of state laws dealing with controlled substances.
Before trial, Knowles moved to suppress the evidence so obtained. He argued that the search could not be sustained under the “search incident to arrest” exception recognized in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), because he had not been placed under arrest. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the police officer conceded that he had neither Knowles’ consent nor probable cause to conduct the search. He relied on Iowa law dealing with such searches.
In Robinson, supra, we noted the two historical rationales for the “search incident to arrest” exception: (1) the need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody, and (2) the need to preserve evidence for later use at trial. 414 U.S., at 234. See also United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 802—803 (1974); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762—763 (1969); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914). But neither of these underlying rationales for the search incident to arrest exception is sufficient to justify the search in the present case.
We have recognized that the first rationale–officer safety–is “ ‘both legitimate and weighty,’ ” Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 412 (1997) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110 (1977) (per curiam)). The threat to officer safety from issuing a traffic citation, however, is a good deal less than in the case of a custodial arrest. In Robinson, we stated that a custodial arrest involves “danger to an officer” because of “the extended exposure which follows the taking of a suspect into custody and transporting him to the police station.” 414 U.S., at 234—235. We recognized that “[t]he danger to the police officer flows from the fact of the arrest, and its attendant proximity, stress, and uncertainty, and not from the grounds for arrest.” Id., at 234, n. 5. A routine traffic stop, on the other hand, is a relatively brief encounter and “is more analogous to a so-called ‘Terry stop’ … than to a formal arrest.” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437 (1984). See also Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296 (1973) (“Where there is no formal arrest . . . a person might well be less hostile to the police and less likely to take conspicuous, immediate steps to destroy incriminating evidence”).
This is not to say that the concern for officer safety is absent in the case of a routine traffic stop. It plainly is not. See Mimms, supra, at 110; Wilson, supra, at 413—414. But while the concern for officer safety in this context may justify the “minimal” additional intrusion of ordering a driver and passengers out of the car, it does not by itself justify the often considerably greater intrusion attending a full field-type search. Even without the search authority Iowa urges, officers have other, independent bases to search for weapons and protect themselves from danger. For example, they may order out of a vehicle both the driver, Mimms, supra, at 111, and any passengers, Wilson, supra, at 414; perform a “patdown” of a driver and any passengers upon reasonable suspicion that they may be armed and dangerous, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); conduct a “Terry patdown” of the passenger compartment of a vehicle upon reasonable suspicion that an occupant is dangerous and may gain immediate control of a weapon, Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983); and even conduct a full search of the passenger compartment, including any containers therein, pursuant to a custodial arrest, New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981).
In Robinson, we held that the authority to conduct a full field search as incident to an arrest was a “bright-line rule,” which was based on the concern for officer safety and destruction or loss of evidence, but which did not depend in every case upon the existence of either concern. Here we are asked to extend that “bright-line rule” to a situation where the concern for officer safety is not present to the same extent and the concern for destruction or loss of evidence is not present at all. We decline to do so. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Iowa is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
I stand that the officer had no reason what so ever to pull her out of the car, he invented a frivolous one. Mimms is not a blank check.
the stop was over, he was handing her the warning. Where is the impending danger to the officer?
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