Daddy4UdderSlut -> RE: "Mass Murder on an Un-Imaginable Scale!" (8/16/2006 4:25:05 PM)
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NorthernGent, You are certainly entitled to your own opinion, but I wish you'd take more of a look at what is there before passing judegment - a good look, as there are actually dozens of pages of information, written by multiple authors and transcripts of interviews with numerous sources from many countries and many sources of viewpoints on this problem. In my opinion, there is a lot to learn here, and many expert viewpoints are heard from... and because of that, I don't think anyone would agree with all of it - it's not a monolithic viewpoint that is presented, but many voices. Some of the questions that are examined here are - what is the recent history of Muslim radicalism? What are the religious and ideological justifications for terrorist actions? What are the practical justifications? What is jihad? Salafism? Who are most likely to transition from moderate to radical Muslims? Where is the movement going? What can be done about it? As to your point that Al Qaeda is not a sophisticated organization, well, if we compare them to say, large governmental organizations or corporations, I think that clearly this is true. However, in a sense, their very lack of formal organizational structure or physical infrastructure is itself part of the problem. It makes their 'members' hard to identify and their movements and plans difficult to follow. It's a loosely coupled, highly distributed and highly informal movement. That's bad news for trying to take it on with centralized and formal structures. Here is a little excerpt from just one of the interviews with just one of the counterterrorist experts interviewed - four of those, to represent the perspective of that point of view... quote:
So this is an ideological movement, a movement that has an intellectual rationale to it? Of course. It is something like on the other side and in most ancient times, what became the Crusades against the Middle East has little to [do] with Catholicism per se. It was a political doctrine to fight for the faith, but it was not the faith by itself. Islam is something, and Salafiyya is something else. And also one should remember that all the Salafists are not jihadi. Some of them believe that the world would be better if things were run like the prophet run them in the two holy cities of Medina and Mecca in the sixth century of the Christian era, but still they don't want to kill you for that. And only part of the Salafists are violent. What we call the jihadi are the violent Salafists. [image]http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/front/art/blank.gif[/image] So it's a sect within a group of religious believers within a larger religion? Exactly. It's a problem that is going smaller and smaller, and the fanatics are not so many. I talked with several important muftis in Britain, for instance, and they told me that among the people coming into their mosques, the real fanatics, the violent Salafists, the jihadi people who actually participate in the jihad or pay for it are maybe 1 or 2 percent of the population of the Muslims going to the mosques. And still this population of Muslims actually going to the mosques in Britain on Friday, the holy day, is maybe 30 percent of all the Muslim community. It should be about the same in France and in other European countries, but in Britain we have the proper figures because they did a poll, so to say. So you have 100 Muslims; then you have 30 of them going to the mosque, and among the 30 percent going to the mosque, the real fanatics are maybe 1 or 2 percent, not more. But what is the real problem now is, what with the Iraqi situation and the occupied territory/Palestine situation, you've got a lot of people in the Muslim world that are indignant. They are mad at what is going [on]. And when you add these indignant or furious people, or humiliated people, to the 1 or 2 percent of fanatics, it makes a big crowd. This is the problem now. There is, in a sense, an ideological sympathy in the population for people to take violent retribution? Of course. If you go and when you go to the Arab Peninsula, all the countries -- Kuwait, Arabia, Saudi Arabia, Yemen -- everywhere you've got television screens with [Al] Arabiya or Al Jazeera. Day after day, hour after hour, you've got the tanks going in the cities in the Occupied Territories. You've got tanks and bombs flying over Fallujah, mothers crying, children crying. And this is going on for years now. So a lot of young people -- don't forget that maybe half of the Saudi population is less than 25 years old -- when you're young and you see that, you revolt; you want to do something. And part of these people joined the jihadi who, without these screens and images all day long, would be maybe less than 5 percent of the population, even in the Arabian Peninsula. : : One should understand what really is jihad for a Muslim, for any Muslim in the world. It's a totally personal thing. Nobody -- and read what bin Laden says. He never gives orders. [He's] not a general; it's not an army. He says, "The good Muslim should understand that one should fight the infidels," and so on. "I am happy to see that some infidel has been hit in Casablanca," whatever. He never gives orders. Jihad is a purely personal matter. You stop smoking; it's jihad. You start a diet; it's something that ... you force yourself to do. It's either a personal thing like refraining from smoking, as I said, or the greater jihad is fighting the infidels. But it's something personal. Nobody in the world, even if he were to resuscitate the prophet himself, could order a Muslim to fight a jihad. So you, after looking too much at Arabiya or Al Jazeera TV, you feel mad about what the Crusader or the Jews are doing to the Muslims, so you decide to join a jihadi group. But it's personal. The day you want to get out of the game, nobody can force you to stay. And if a small cell is built up, created, and they decide that bin Laden is the right thing to do, then the mufti of this small group, the religious leader, two weeks later says, "No, no, he's not good; he's an apostate, and we should go to another leader," they can go there, and nobody can force them to stay. It's very volatile. ... But you obviously feel that the strength of this movement has increased since 9/11. Let's be perfectly clear: What is happening now on the West Bank and more than that, even in Iraq, has created more jihadi than the ones that are being killed day after day in Iraq or on the left. Maybe you have now five times as many. It's a guess, of course. We don't have the roll calls of the jihad movement; such a thing doesn't exist. But we have many more jihadis than in 2001, of course. ... I have some knowledge of British counterterrorism and counterinsurgency doctrine and think there are a lot of good ideas there. Some of those same ideas are expressed here - that of feeding the fire through use of excessive or indiscriminate force, for example.
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