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CrappyDom -> RE: Left wing media. (10/14/2006 6:59:07 AM)
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Cleaver, for the most part I agree with you in your discussion with NG and was simply pointing out that the RAF "won" the battle of britain through bravery but with a very healthy dose of incompetence on the part of the leadership of the Luftwaffe. The Germans lost the airwar over England because they didn't understand it, not because the RAF was superior.
The reason I say that is because they failed at a very basic level of understanding how the RAF was fighting them. They assumed the Brits were fighting them in the same antiquated way the Germans were. If they had realized the significance of the radar stations and taken them out in combination with air raids on the air fields, no amount of bravery or superior aircraft would have won the air war for England. The RAF won the war with a smaller weaker force because they were able to apply it affectively against the Germans through the use of radar. If they were denied that ability, the larger German airforce would have easily won. The Germans failed to grasp that and lost.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Britain
quote:
Luftwaffe targets RAF airfields
From 24 August onwards, the battle was essentially a slugging match between Kesselring's Luftflotte 2 and Keith Park's 11 Group. The Luftwaffe concentrated all their strength on knocking out Fighter Command and made repeated attacks on the airfields. Of the 33 heavy attacks in the next two weeks, 24 were against airfields. The key sector stations were hit repeatedly: Biggin Hill and Hornchurch four times each, Debden and North Weald twice each. Croydon, Gravesend, Rochford, Hawkinge and Manston were also attacked in strength. No fewer than seven attempts were made against Eastchurch, which was not a Fighter Command aerodrome but was believed to be by the intelligence-starved Germans. At times these raids knocked out the sector stations, threatening the integrity of the Dowding system. Emergency measures had to be taken to keep the sectors operating.
These were desperate times for the RAF, which was also taking many casualties in the air. Aircraft production could replace aircraft but replacement pilots were barely keeping place with losses, and novice flyers were being shot down in droves. Most replacements had as little as nine hours flying time and no combat training. At this point the multinational nature of the RAF came to the fore. With many pilots from the Dominions already serving in Fighter Command — Australians, South Africans, New Zealanders and Canadians — they were bolstered by the arrival of fresh Czechoslovak and Polish squadrons. These squadrons had been held back by Dowding, who mistakenly thought the non-English speaking aircrew would have trouble working within his control system. In addition there were other nationals, including Free French, Belgian and even a Palestinian Jewish pilot serving amongst the squadrons.
(edited section deleted for brevity)
And yet, the Luftwaffe was winning this battle of the airfields. Another fortnight of this pounding and the RAF might have been forced to withdraw their squadrons from the south of England. This was not clear to the Luftwaffe command, which had watched its bomber force start to waste away and had grown desperate to deliver on the original timetable. They could not understand why the RAF hadn't yet collapsed, or how they were always able to get fighters to the place they were needed, no matter how many raids were sent. Something needed to be done to force the RAF into a decisive battle.
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