RapierFugue
Posts: 4740
Joined: 3/16/2006 From: London, England Status: offline
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quote:
ORIGINAL: barelynangel Ahh okay, i don't know much about the logistics of that. Ok, there are 2 main potentials, in terms of pre-screening. 1. Identifying the person and 2. Identifying them as a risk (or not, of course). The no-fly list is a "positive exclusion" operation; "if your name's on the list you ain't getting in". What pre-screening does is to say "the people on this list are known low-risk (or even negative risk), verified individuals". So you would need a secure, biometric card (say) that identifies you. The technology to do this is known, mature, and works - your own military (and mine) use it for high-value installations, for example. Since the information on the card is keyed to your genetic code, and hard-coded, you can't "fake" the ID, because the checksums embedded in the card mean that, even if someone knew how to substitute one genetic sequence for another (highly unlikely) then they still wouldn't know in what form that information was encrypted. So that's stage one - I'd know, as a security person, that the person standing in front of me was you, definitely you. Stage two is (ahead of time) you are background checked, and any anomalies are discussed or, if necessary, investigated. Note that the overwhelming majority of people would sail those checks without issue. So now you have a list of those who are authorised as safe, and the means to identify them when they present themselves. So you end up with a "flight card" you just swipe at a barrier, identify yourself via biometrics, and that's you done. Sensibly, as a precaution, you could still operate the Israeli system too, while people are queuing - you ask a limited number of simple questions, some of which are designed to identify people as suspects directly, and some of which cause their panic reflex to trigger if they're lying (hence you need trained operatives to marshal the system, but it's not so much the answers to those other questions that matter, it's your reaction). Again, the overwhelming majority of people would fly those, without issue. You end up with a system that's very fast, non-invasive, and above all is secure. You can then take the money saved and throw it at baggage scanning, which is still a very hit & miss affair, and very dependent on human monitoring - attempts to automate the process have proved fruitless thus far, on either density or atomic weight scans* for explosives. So you'd end up with speedily processed, happy, non-invaded passengers, and luggage that almost certainly doesn't contain a bomb. Then you'd need to actually make airport entry secure, from a physical and employee check perspective, but that's not un-doable. *I only know this latter thing coz it's what a mate of mine did his PhD in a couple of years back
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