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quote:
the newspapers of the following morning reported that the government had decided to ignore the Potsdam Declaration. I protested without delay to the Cabinet when it met, pointing out that the report was at variance with our decision of the preceding day. What had happened, I learned, was this. There had been held in the Imperial Palace, after adjournment of the Cabinet the day before, a conference for exchange of information between government and high command. This was a routine weekly meeting without special significance, and I had been absent because of more important business. One of the military participants in that meeting, as I heard it, had proposed the rejection of the Potsdam Declaration; the Premier, the War and Navy Ministers and the two Chiefs of Staff had hastily assembled for consultation in a separate room, and the Premier had been persuaded by the more militant elements to that course. He then stated at a subsequent press conference that the government had decided to ignore the declaration, and this announcement it was which the press had played up so sensationally. It was only after the affair had developed to this point that I first knew of it; despite my thorough dissatisfaction with the position, there was of course no way of withdrawing the statement released by the Premier, and things had to be left as they stood. In the result, the American press reported that Japan had rejected the declaration, and President Truman in deciding for use of the atomic bomb, and the U.S.S.R. in attacking Japan, referred to the rejection of it as justification for their respective actions. The incident was thus a deplorable one in its embarrassment of our move for peace, and was most disadvantageous for Japan. http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/hando/togo.htm quote:
The Declaration was thus an ultimatum falling short of a demand for unconditional surrender, since it included guarantees that ordinary Japanese soldiers would not be interned indefinitely; that Japanese industry would not be eliminated and Japan would be given access to raw materials; and that the occupation would not be indefinite and the main Japanese home islands would eventually regain their sovereignty. In addition, the Declaration placed the blame for pursuing the war on "self-willed militaristic advisers" rather than the Emperor. While falling far short of guaranteeing the status of the Emperor as formal head of state in the postwar government, this assignment of war guilt at least suggested the possibility that the Emperor could be retained. The intial response of the Japanese Government to the Declaration was mokusatsu, http://pwencycl.kgbudge.com/P/o/Potsdam_Declaration.htm quote:
Emperor Hirohito and his chief political adviser, Kido Koichi, stuck with the militarists and insisted on continuing with preparations for final battles on the home islands even in late June, when all organized resistance on Okinawa had ended, and an estimated 120,000 Japanese combatants (including Koreans and Taiwanese) and 150,000 to 170,000 non-combatants lay dead. U.S. combat losses in the battle of Okinawa were approximately 12,520 killed and over 33,000 wounded. With time accelerating and their sense of the urgency of the situation deepening, Hirohito responded to this defeat by forcing the army and navy leaders to agree to the idea of an "early peace." But he still gave no indication that he was thinking in terms of an immediate surrender, let alone proposing peace to the nations he was actually fighting. Into the month of July, the leaders of the imperial armed forces clung to the idea that as Allied lines of supply and communication lengthened, their own forces would do better on the homeland battlefields. But by this time Japan had virtually no oil, its cities were in ruins and its navy and naval air capability virtually non-existent. It is unclear at what point Hirohito abandoned the illusion that his armed forces remained capable of delivering at least one devastating blow to the enemy so that his diplomats could negotiate a surrender on face saving terms. But six months of intensive U.S. terror bombing of the Japanese civilian population had forced him, the Court group, and the government to take into account not only their huge losses of men and materials, but also food shortages and the growing war-weariness of the Japanese people. How could they lead and preserve their system of rule after peace returned? That question weighed on their minds when the Potsdam Declaration arrived (July 27-28), calling on them to surrender unconditionally or face immediate destruction. Yet they rejected the four-power ultimatum, feeling as former prime minister and navy "moderate," Admiral Yonai Mitsumasa, said to his secretary on July 28, "There is no need to rush." http://japanfocus.org/products/details/1787
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